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1.  Cooperation: The diverse attemps in defining it 
 
When looking at the literature, three aspects strike the reader immediately: 
first, that cooperation is a topic that has received enormous attention from researchers 
of all fields (econonmics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, 
organization theory, organizational behavior and strategic management). Second that 
the importance of cooperation has been recognized for a fairely long time now - be it 
to the succes of organizations (Barnard, 1938), the effectiveness of in- or out-groups 
working together (Wageman & Baker, 1997) or generally in any situation where  
activities of differentiated tasks must be coordinated and a common end is to be 
persuit rather than an individual goal (Koch & Koch, 2007; Wagner, 1995). And third, 
that despite the apparent importance of cooperation, it is far from being clear, what 
cooperation actually is. Its definition varies not only depending on the field of 
research and within these fields (evolutionary versus organizational psychology), but 
also highly depends on the author’s idea of man: While some see it as an effort 
undertaken in favor of group work in order to enhance group performance (Kidwell & 
Bennett, 1993; Wagner, 1995), assuming that „cooperation will not continue if its 
benefits do not equal or exceed its costs“ (Smith, Carroll & Ashford, 1995), others 
consider effort and cooperative behavior as two distinct processes (Wageman et al., 
1997) and emphasize the interpersonal aspect by speaking of cooperative 
relationships (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). 
Therefore, an overview of cooperation definitions in organizational and social 
psychology will be given in the following sections. 
1.1   Cooperation as psychological motives  
In her extensive study on primitive peoples, Mead (1937) distinguishes three 
different kinds of behavior: competitive and cooperative – which are not opposites 
since they are „so loosely used in popular speech“ (p.16) – and individualistic. 
Altough cooperation is defined as „the act of working together to one end“ and 
competition – accordingly – as „the act of seeking or endeavoring to gain what 
another is endeavoring to gain at the same time“ (p.8),  it must be noted, that the 
aspect that is actually stressed in her definition is the underlying motivation of the 
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acting individuals: a man hunting alone still is engaged in a cooperative enterprise as 
long as he hunts in order to contribute his prey animal to a communal feast. Thus, 
interaction is not required in this definition. In that cooperation reflects a motive and 
it is each individual’s relationship to the goal that determines whether or not it is 
cooperative behavior, she distiguishes cooperation from helpfulness since in the latter 
„the goal is shared only through the relationship of the helpers to the individual whose 
goal it actuall is“ (Mead, 1937, p.17). That is to say, in helpfulness, the emphasis is on 
the relationship, not on the goal itself, as it is in cooperation. These goals which 
motivate human behavior are shaped by the culture people live in (i.e. traditional 
behavior that is characteristic of a certain society, area or period of time) and are not 
the result of an external situation, like scarcity of food, for instance. 
1.2   Cooperation in terms of goal structure  
Deutsch (1949) in his seminal work, defines three different kinds of objective 
relationships between goals: cooperative social situations are those in which the goals 
of the individuals are positively related to each other, i.e. that an individual can only 
attain his or her goal, when the others can attain their goal as well. Hence, the 
individual aspires to an outcome that is beneficial to all those participants he or she is 
positively linked with. From such a situation of „promotively interdependent goals“ 
(Deutsch, 1949, p. 132) result promotively interdependent locomotions of the people 
involved in the direction of these goals. A competitive social sitauation, on the 
contrary, is one where the individual can only attain his or her goal if the other 
participants cannot achieve their aims, i.e. their goals are negatively related, or, as 
Deutsch puts it, „contriently interdependent goals“ (p. 132), leading to contriently 
interdependent locomotions. The third category according to Deutsch consists of 
individualistic situations in which the respective goals are not related at all, i.e. they 
are independent from each other. Based on these assumptions, Deutsch proposed that 
such goal interdependence has direct consequences for the dynamics and outcomes of 
interactions. Accordingly, he theorized that cooperators are willing to help each other, 
to share resources and to consider each other’s ideas open-mindedly, thus supporting 
constructive conflict management. 
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A conception of cooperation close to this one is the one suggested by Kelley and 
Thibaut (1969), who employ the term of rewards rather than goals. A structure is 
cooperative when the individual’s reward is directly proportional to the quality of the 
group work, it is competitive when one person receives a maximun reward and the 
others a minimum – and it is indiviualistic when the individuals’ rewards are 
independent of each other. According to the authors, it is these reward distribution 
systems that motivate people to behave cooperatively – thus not giving a definition, of 
what cooperation actually is. 
An approach similar to the one proposed by Deutsch (1949), yet slightly 
different is the one offered by Tjosvold (1986, 1988) who makes a distinction 
between objective goal interdependence, as it is reflected by the reward and task 
structure, and the subjective goal interdependence, as it is perceived by the members 
of an organization. According to his theory, employees construct their idea of mutual 
dependence or independence using the organization’s culture and structure. The 
conclusions they draw about their mutual dependence, i.e. the subjective 
interdependence, mediates the effect of objective tasks and rewards on their 
interaction. In a study interviewing 27 managers from an engenieering consulting firm 
and 43 employees of a utility company (Tjosvold, 1988), it was demonstrated that a 
common task, shared rewards and mutual trust brought people to perceive their goals 
as linked, that is to say to perceive cooperative goals. Such a perception of the 
situation was, in return, linked to employees helping each other by exchanging 
resources, positive feelings about the interaction, confidence concerning future work 
together and progress on the task (Tjosvold, 1988). That is to say that cooperative 
interaction was strongly linked to both good working relationships and progress on 
the task. 
What is striking and must be highlighted is that this definition constitues a 
tautology for the purpose of the current study: here, the definition of cooperation itself 
is put on a level with reward structure, which otherwise is regarded as a possible 
means of fostering cooperation (see section 3), hence this approach does not 
distinguish between cooperation and how it can be fostered or hindered by certain 
goal or reward structures.  
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1.3   Cooperation as behavior  
While some authors like Barnard (1938) give an extremely broad definition of 
cooperation as a behavior, stating that it is a „functional system of activities of two or 
more persons“ (p.17), there are more specific approches to define and operationalize 
cooperation as a behavior. These can be devided into three quite different groups: One 
that defines cooperation via its opposits, such as defection in the literature on social or 
prisoner’s dilemma (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Komorita, Hilty & Parks, 1991; Komorita 
and Parks, 1995; Pillutla & Chen, 1999) or as social loafing (e.g. Wagner, 1995). 
Second, approaches defining cooperation as a conflict style (e.g. deDreu et al. 2000) 
and third, those focusing on interaction, extra-role and nonrewarded activities, such as 
in the organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) literature (e.g. Argyle,1991; Dávila 
de Leon & Finkelstein, 2011; Moorman & Blakely, 1995;  Van Dyne et al., 1994). 
 
1.3.1 Defining cooperation via its opposite: social loafing and defection 
Social loafing, i.e. individuals exerting less effort when working in a group 
than when working alone, and free riding, i.e. reduced effort and letting the others do 
the work when an indivisible public good is involved (Kidwell et al., 1993), have 
been seen – implicitely or explicitely –as the opposites of cooperation (Wagner, 
1995), as they constitute the „choice to withhold cooperative effort from group 
endeavors“ (p.156). It becomes obvious, however, that in this field of literature 
emphasis is put on effort, i.e. on aspects related to performance, thus outcome. From 
this follows that cooperation is a behavioral pattern that is defined as increasing a 
group’s output. This kind of definition makes the research on the relation between 
cooperation and group performance (e.g. Allen, Sargent & Bradley, 2003; Wageman 
et al., 1997) dispensable since it equates cooperation and outcome, thus, again, 
creating a tautology. 
In addition to that, it implies an idea of man, where interpersonal aspects of 
the act of cooperating with others are ignored, taking only into account economic 
dimensions and leaving out the importance of cooperation for the maintainance of 
social relationships (Alencar, de Oliveira Siqueira & Yamamoto, 2007). Moreover, 
according to Sampson (1988), the conceptualization of cooperation as the opposite of 
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social loafing is of limited applicability to collectivists. To conclude, this definition 
presents major theoretical shortcomings, which is why it will be disregarded in the 
following. 
Defection. Prisoner’s dilemma or public good games have been used 
extensively to operationalize cooperation in experimental studies – by opposing it  to 
defection (e.g. Probst & Triandis, 1999; Chen & Li, 2005; Chen, Wasti & Triandis, 
2007; González Beltrán & Santoyo Velasco, 2007; Koch et al., 2007; Pillutla et al., 
1999). By doing so, cooperation is delineated as a very specific behavior under very 
specific circumstances. Emanating from the assumption that people are self-seeking 
egoists (Axelrod, 1984), defection constitutes the choice that maximizes one’s own 
outcome and exposes the partner(s) to the risk of gaining nothing in the interaction – a 
selfish choice that, if made by both/all, leads for both/all parties to a lower outcome 
than the one obtained if both/all made the cooperative yet risky choice. That is to say 
that this conception of cooperation always opposes personal to group interests and 
thus a decision must be made between maximizing one of them (Pillutla et al., 1999). 
The pay-off matrix is build in a way so that it is better to defect no matter whether one 
expects her/his partner to defect or to cooperate, but this individual rationality leads to 
a worse outcome for both parties than the mutual cooperation. Hence, cooperation 
constitutes the choice that maximizes group interest and puts one’s self-interest at 
risk. 
Hence, it assumes that people are interdependent in their respective outcomes, 
since the individual’s pay-off depends on the partner’s choice and the players’ 
interests are not in total conflict. Therefore, compared to the approach that defines 
cooperation in terms of goal structure, there are no goal relations that the players can 
take for granted, cooperation rather constitutes the choice to accept the uncertainity of 
the partner’s behavior. 
Interestingly, while this conception emanates from the assumption of people 
being selfish, it emphazises that expecting the partner to act selfish leads to one’s own 
defection, thus „causing unending punishment“ (Axelrod, 1984, p.15). So, despite the 
fundamental assumption of selfishness, the solution lies in its overcoming. Therefore, 
much of the literature operationalizing cooperation via social/ prisoner’s dilemmas, 
investigates the role of trust, reciprocity and feedback on the partner’s behavior in the 
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fostering of cooperative choices (e.g. Dasgupta, 2009; Komorita et al., 1991; Pillutla 
et al. 1999). 
The clear advantage of this approach lies in its behavioral specificity. 
However, it reduces the scope and complexity of cooperative behaviors in real life 
(Argyle, 1991; Chen et al., 1998) and suffers, therefore, from low external validity. 
 
1.3.2 Cooperation as a conflict style 
Cooperation as a behavior not only plays a role in working situations in 
general, but especially when conflicts occur at work. Four different kinds of conflict 
resolution styles are generally identified (Boros, Meslec, Curseu & Emons, 2009): 
The contending/dominating style is the one where people tend to ignore the needs of 
others since they strive for their own goals. The avoiding conflict style is the one in 
which people withdraw or sidestep situations and, thus, fail to satisfy their own needs 
as well as those of the other party. The cooperating/ integrating style is marked by 
openness, that is to say that people are willing to explore the existing differences and 
to exchange information in order to find effective solutions that fit the needs of 
both/all parties. The fourth conflict resolution style consists in involving a third-party, 
i.e. an external mediator for negotiating and finding a solution (Boros et al., 2009).  
The cooperating conflict resolution style, however, can be further devided into 
three subgroups: problem solving, yielding and compromising (DeDreu & Van 
Vianen, 2001).  „Problem solving“ desigantes a coopeartive conflict resolution style 
in which the parties seek a solution that is beneficial to all of them. A conflict 
resolution style is  called „yielding“ when one party makes unilateral concessions and 
it is called „compromising“ when the conflict is solved by splitting the differences. 
 
1.3.3 Organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and the interactional approch 
to cooperation 
The classical definition of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) given by 
Organ (1988) characterizes it as „ individual behavior that is discetionary, not directly 
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or explicitely recognized by the formal reward systems, and that in the aggregate 
promotes the efficient and effective functioning of the organization“ (p.4). In this 
context, „discretionary“ describes behavior that is not enforcable by the employment 
contract and which’s omission, thus, is not punishable. OCB comprises several 
different dimensions: Altruism (Organ, 1988; Smith, Organ & Near, 1983), i.e. 
voluntary helping others with, or prevent the occurence of, work-related problems 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine & Bachrach, 2000). The second dimension is called 
generalized compliance by some authors (Smith et al.1993) or conscientiousness 
(Organ, 1988) or organizational obedience (Graham, 1991) by others. It comprises 
impersonal behaviors such as the internalization of and adherence to the 
organization’s norms and rules, even when their compliance is not monitored 
(Podsakoff et al., 2000). The third element is sportsmanship, i.e. for instance not 
complaining about negligible matters (Organ, 1988) or maintaining a positive attitude 
even when one cannot get one’s way (Podsakoff et al., 2000). The fourth aspect of 
OCB is called courtesy (Organ, 1988) or individual initiative or personal industry 
(Moorman et al., 1995) and it describes behaviors that go beyond the call of duty, 
such as advising with others before taking action. Given that it differs more in degree 
than in kind, it is the OCB dimension that is most difficult to distinguish from in-role 
behaviors (Organ, 1988). The last element of OCB is civic virtue (Organ, 1988) or 
organizational participation (Graham, 1991) which reflects a macro-level interest in, 
or committment to, the organization as a whole, comprising the disposition to actively 
participate in its governance, to keep up with matters affecting the organization or 
looking out for its best interests, even at great personal costs (Podsakoff et al., 2000). 
As suggested by Williams and Anderson (1991), these behavioral elements 
can conceptually be divided into two subgroups of OCB, according to the behaviors’ 
beneficiary: OCB directed toward individuals (OCB-I) and OCB directed toward the 
organization (OCB-O) or, as Coleman and Borman (2000) name it: interpersonal 
citizenship performance and organizational citizenship performance, with – 
respectively – the former ones comprising altruism and courtesy and the latter ones 
comprising sportsmanship, civic virtue and conscientousness.  
To conclude, OCB comprises behavioral aspects that are voluntary displayed, 
that benefit the organization’s effective funtioning and which constitute extra-role 
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behavior. However, it comprises both elements that involve interaction with others 
and some that do not. 
This interactional aspect seems yet particularly relevant when it comes to 
cooperation. Dimensional approaches to cooperation list behaviors like helping, 
communication and coordination (Argyle, 1991) or resource and information 
exchange, giving assistance, constructive discussion of problems and conflicts as well 
as mutual support and encouragement (Tjosvold, 1988). So, in that OCB constitutes 
voluntary, extra-role behavior that benefits the organization and involves interaction 
with others, it overlaps with cooperative behavior (Chen, 1998). 
 
2. Individualism – collectivism and its relation to cooperation 
 
Individualism-collectivism is the dimension that has been investigated most 
when cultures other than the so-called Western one where researched. It was found to 
play a role in a great varity of topics such as conflict behavior (e.g. Forbes, 
Collinsworth, Zhao, Kohlman & LeClaire, 2011), competitveness (e.g. Houston, 
Edge, Anderson, Lesmana & Suryani, 2012), brand loyalty (e.g. Wu, 2011) work-
values (e.g. Hartung, Fouad, Leong & Hardin, 2010), empathy (e.g. Duan, Wei & 
Wang, 2008), subjective well-being (e.g. Suh, 2002) and the question if cultures are 
becoming more individualistic over time is also investigated (e.g. Hamamura, 2012) – 
to name only a few aspects. 
Its definition, however, is farely complex, and oftenly no clear distinction is 
drawn between its attributes and its consequences. In addition to that, there is a whole 
clutch of different instruments measuring – or attempting to measure – individualism-
collectivism. Therefore, a review of the different theoretical definitions and measures 
will be given in the following sections, as well as its possible relations to cooperation 
will be summarized. 
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2.1  What is individualism-collectivism? 
Hofstede (1980) is oftenly considered the godfather of the construct 
individualism-collectivism, as he was the first one to examine systematically and 
cross –culturally with a large set of data the dimenions along which cultures can be 
described and distinguished. Individualism-collectivism (I/C) was one of these four 
(and later five) dimensions he identified in his work. However, though he initiated a 
huge amount of research on this topic by emphasizing that the distinction between 
individualism-collectivism has become the main challenge to the universal 
applicability of Western psychological theories, he has not been the first nor the last 
one to use this term and to try to define it. The roots of this concept date back to the 
ancient Greeks, when Aristoteles, in his individualist-leaning Politics, criticized 
Plato’s collectivistic vision in Republic. Later, Weber (1958) and also Fromm (1941) 
described how Protestantism was both a result of the breaking down of collectivistic 
medieval societal structures and how at the same time it promoted indivudualistic 
tendencies, leading to more self-reliance and increasing the focus on the pursuit of 
personal interests. 
 
2.1.1  Individualism – collectivism according to Hofstede 
In his seminal work „Culture’s consequences“ (1980/2001), Hofstede presents 
the findings from a survey he conducted in a large multinational business organization 
in 53 countries, in which he collected data in 1968 and 1972 producing over 116,000 
questionnaires. From the results he obtained there, he derived four (and later five) 
dimensions along which cultures can be distinguished: power distance, masculinity, 
uncertainity avoidance, long- versus short-term orientation and individualism-
collectivism. Individualism-collectivism is here considered on a cultural level, that is 
to say that the unit of examination are cultures/societies, not individuals and – 
consequently – he computed an Individualism Index (INV) for each of the 53 
countries (Hofstede, 2001) (for further details concerning the level of analysis, see 
section 2.1.5). In this perspective, individualism and collectivism are considered the 
opposite ends of one single dimension, that is to say that the more collectivistic a 
country is, the less individualistic it is at the same time, and vice versa. 
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 Right in the beginning of the book, i.e. in the summary, Hofstede states that 
individualism – collectivism is the „degree to which individuals are supposed to look 
after themselves or remain integrated into groups, usually around the family. 
Positioning itself between these poles is a very basic problem all societies face“ 
(Hofstede, 2001, p. XX). It thus decribes the „relationship between the individual and 
the collectivity that prevails in a given society [...], it is reflected in the way people 
live together [...], and it has many implications for values and behavior“ (Hofstede, 
2001, p. 209)   
 Individualism is characterized by a „loosely knit social framework in which 
people are supposed to take care of themselves and of their immediate families only“ 
while collectivism is characterized by a „tight social framework in which people 
distinguish between ingroups and outgroups, they expect their ingroup to look after 
them, and in exchange for that they feel they owe absolute loyalty to it’“ (Hofstede, 
1980, p. 45, as cited in Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006) 
He summarizes a number of different aspects that may be seen as reflecting 
individualism-collectivism or, at least, as being closely linked to I/C. For one, it is 
reflected in the complexity of the family units that people live in (i.e. if they live in 
nuclear or extended families). Second, it affects various institutions aside from the 
familiy (political, educational and religious ones, for instance) via societal norms. 
Third, in the Chinese tradition (as an example of a collctivistic culture), there is no 
equivalent for the Western construct of „personality“ as a seperate entity that is 
distinct from society and culture (Hofstede, 2001).  
The concept of individualism-collectivism is also related to the difference 
between cultures that emphasize shame versus those which emphasize guilt: since 
shame is a feeling that requires an audience, shame cultures rely on sanctions 
(Benedict, 1946), thus they fit the description of collectivistic societies (Hofstede, 
2001). Guilt cultures, on the contrary, rely on an „internalized conviction of sin“ 
(Benedict, 1946, p. 222). Therefore, guilt does not require an audience since „a man 
may suffer from guilt though no man knows of his misdeed“ (Benedict, 1946, p. 222). 
Hence, guilt cultures fit the description of individualistic societies. 
Another aspect of individualism-collectivism, according to Hofstede (2001), is 
the distinction between high- and low-context communication, introduced by Hall 
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(1976). In low-context communication, the bulk of information is made explicit, 
which is typical for individualistic cultures, while in high-context communication, 
most of the information is in the physical environment or it is internalized in the 
persons, which is typical for collectivistic cultures (Hofstede, 2001). 
Triandis and his colleagues (Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi & Yoon, 1994; 
Triandis, 1995; Triandis, 1996; Triandis et al., 1998) have then made some major 
contributions to the research in the field of individualism-collectivism and changed 
the perspective from the cultural level to the individual (see section 2.1 5). 
 
2.1.2  Vertical and horizontal aspects of I/C 
The most important theoretical extension of  the construct of individualism-
collectivism introduced by Triandis and colleagues (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk & 
Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995) consisted in distinguishing vertical and horizontal 
aspects of individualism-collectivism, thus establishing four instead of two categories: 
vertical individualism (VI), vertical collectivism (VC), horizontal individualism (HI), 
and horizontal collectivism (HC) (Singelis, et al., 1995; Triandis, 1995; Triandis et al. 
1998). The vertical versus horizontal dimension refers to the extent to which people 
perceive and accept inequalities in social relationships, especially concerning status. 
That is to say that horizontal collectivism (HC) is a cultural pattern, where individuals 
see themselves as an aspect of an in-group and as closely tied to this group, but they 
consider themselves as equal to others while in vertical collectivism (VC) people 
accept that some members of their in-group have more status than others and, thus, 
serving and sacrificing for this in-group is an important aspect. Accordingly, in 
horizontal individualism (HI) the self is seen as autonomous but equal to others and 
self-reliance is stressed, while in vertical individualism (VI) people are seen as 
different from each other and inequalities are expected, thus competition plays an 
important role. In other terms, the vertical aspect concerns power (in vertical 
collectivism) or achievement values (in vertical individualism) and the horizontal 
aspect consists of benevolence (in horizontal collectivism) or universalism (in 
horizontal individualism) (Paquet & Kline, 2009). 
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This additional dimension of horizontal versus vertical I/C has been 
theoretically related to the independent-interdependent and same-different self-
construal as suggested by Markus and Kitayama (1991) in their seminal work on 
culture and the self. It is argued that vertical individualism (VI) represented an 
independent/different self-construal and horizontal individualism (HI) an 
independent/same self-construal, while vertical collectivism (VC) reflected an 
interdependent/different and horizontal collectivism (HC) an interdependent/same 
self-construal (e.g. Li et al., 2007).  
Other authors, however, see the horizontal/vertical (HV) typology in relation 
to Hofstede’s power distance dimension since both these constructs refer to the extent 
to which individuals emphazise hierarchy or perceive and are willing to accept 
inequalities within a group or society (e.g. Chiou, 2001; Kaushal und Kwantes, 2006). 
Thus, it is argued that the vertical aspects of I/C reflected high and the horizontal 
aspects of I/C reflected low scores on Hofstede’s power-distance dimension (Triandis, 
1995).  
This additional horizontal – vertical dimension of individualism-collectivism 
has proved to be of good use in cross-cultural research. Chen, Meindl & Hunt (1997) 
found preliminary evidence in support of the validity and the usefulness of the 
horizontal – vertical dimensions in I/C (see also Li and Aksoy, 2007).  
 
2.1.3  The four main aspects of I/C according to Triandis and colleagues 
The second major contribution made by Triandis (1995) to the individualism-
collectivism literature consists in the specification of the main dimensions of I/C. 
According to him and his colleagues, it concerns primarily four different aspects: the 
self, goal priority, norms versus attitudes as predictors of social behavior and the 
importance of relationships: While individualist see themselves as autonomous from 
groups, collectivists define themselves as parts of a group. This aspect of I/C relates 
to the distinction between the independent (in individualists) and the interdependent 
(in collectivists) self, as described by Markus et al. (1991). Individualists, i.e. people 
with an independent self, view themselves as a seperate unit that is distinct from other 
people. The identity of this kind of self stems from its inner attributes, which are 
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considered unique, stable across situations and self-contained, i.e. they evolve from 
the individual and not her/his interactions or relations with others (Heine, 2012). 
Collectivists, i.e. people with an interdependent self, can be viewed as a „relational 
entity that is fundamentally connected to, and sustained by, a number of significant 
relationships“ (Heine, 2012, p. 202). The experience of identity of this kind of self 
depends on its position relative to others and the relationship with these others. 
Second, collectivists have personal goals that overlap or are even aligned with 
those of their in-group and in case there is a conflict between the two, they give 
priority to the group’s goal since they are more concerned with group harmony (Chen 
et al., 2007). Individualists’ personal goals, on the contrary, may or may not overlap 
with those of their in-group, i.e., they may even be inconsistent with their in-group’s 
goals (Gelfand, Triandis & Chan, 1996) and in case of discrepancy they find it 
obvious that the personal goal should have priority.  
Third, norms, obligations and perceived duties best predict collectivists’ social 
behavior while individualists’ behavior is mostly governed by their own values and 
attitudes (Suh, 2002), their personal needs and rights or by contracts (Triandis, 1995). 
Bontempo and Rivero (1992, as cited in Triandis, 1995, p. 44) found a correlation of 
.73, p<.001 between Hofstede’s (1980) individualism score of a country and the 
relative importance of norms and attitudes.  
The fourth and last aspect consists in that collectivists tend to stay in 
relationships, even if the costs exceed the benefits, i.e. when they are 
disadvantageous. Individualists, on the contrary, tend to analyze rationally the 
advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a relationship and drop relationships 
when being disadvantageous (Kim et al., 1994; Triandis, 1995). 
 
2.1.4  Further characteristics of individualism-collectivism  
Again, it is Triandis and colleagues (e.g. Kim et al., 1994; Triandis, McCusker 
and Hui, 1990) who describe a whole slew of attributes defining individualism-
collectivism. Most fundamental is the sharp distinction that collectivists draw between 
in- and outgroups, which individualists do not: collectivists pay more attention to 
ingroups and behave differently and apply different value standards, depending on 
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whether they deal with in- or outgroup members, that is to say they are particularistic. 
Individualists, by contrast, treat ingroup and outgroup members rather similarly and 
apply the same value standards to all, i.e. they are more universalistic (Fadil, 
Williams, Limpaphyom & Smatt, 2005). Collectivists have few but stable in-groups 
within which harmony and hierarchy play an important role since „the ingroup is 
supposed to be homogeneous in opinion, and no disagreement should be known to 
outgroups“ (Triandis et al., 1990, p. 1007). Therefore, their behavior is determined by 
these ingroups via norms. Individualists, by contrast, have many ingroups which they 
form and leave easily. Since there are so many ingroups and these may give 
contradictory advice or make contradictory demands, their behavior is therefore not 
influenced by the norms of their ingroup but by their personal attitudes (see above). 
Consequently, the basic unit of analysis for collectivists are groups (in- versus 
outgroups) while for individualists it is individuals. In this context, Triandis et al. 
(1990) found collectivists to perceive their ingroups as more homogeneous than their 
outgroups, while individualists perceive their ingroups as more heterogeneous and 
their outgroups as more heterogeneous.  
When horizontal relationships (e.g. spouse-spouse) are in conflict with vertical 
ones (e.g. parent-child), the latter takes priority over the former in collectivistic 
cultures while the opposite is the case in individualistic cultures (Triandis et al., 
1990). 
How influential the concept of individualism-collectivism is in cross-cultural 
psychology, can be seen in the fact that its relation to or even effect on various other 
constructs like trust, communication and accountability has been extensively 
investigated. For instance, in collectivistic cultures cognitive-based trust, i.e. trust that 
stems from the fact that the other person fulfills his/her responsabilities is only valued 
in out-group relations, while in-group relations necessitate affect-based trust. That is 
to say a kind of trust that indicates a socioemotional bond between the partners: their 
godwill towards each other goes beyond role expectations and includes personal 
concern for the other (Chen, Chen & Meindl, 1998).  
Suh (2002) investigated identity consistency in different cultural contexts and 
found it not to be a universal basic requirement for subjective well-being: while 
identity consistency does affect subjective well-being and leads to positive social 
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evaluations in the U.S. as an individualistic country, it is not related to well-being and 
positive social evaluations in collectivistic cultures such as Korea. 
 
2.1.5  Individualism-colletivism as one or two dimensions? – The level of 
analysis issue 
Hofstede considers individualism-collectivism on a cultural level, that is to say 
that the unit of examination is the number of cultures/countries, not the number of 
individuals (individual level). In this vision, that is to say when culture is the level of 
analysis, individualism and collectivism are considered the opposite ends of a single 
cultural dimension. Consequently, any measure of individualism is considered a 
measure of collectivism as well. At this cultural level, results from factor analysis 
support this view that individualism and collectivism are unidimensional.  
On the contrary to this conception of individualism-collectivism, Triandis and 
his colleagues (Gelfand et al., 1996; Kim et al., 1994; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, 1996; 
Triandis et al., 1998) shift the focus from culture to individuals, that is to say that the 
level of analysis changes. In this perspective, I/C is consider as two distinct 
dimensions that are both multidimensional and that may coexist: collectivism may 
exist in a predominantly individualistic culture and a person can be collectivistic in 
one situation and individualistin in another. On this individual level of analysis, 
results from factor analysis oftenly yield several orthogonal factors that reflect 
individualism and collectivism, suggesting a conceptualization of I/C as two seperate 
and orthogonal constructs. These results imply that individuals who score high on 
collectivism do not necessarily score low on individualism. Therefore, endorsing both 
collectivistic and individualistic values does not constitute a contradiction 
(Kemmelmeier et al., 2003). This conception of I/C on the individual level has been 
confirmed by recent research. Paquet et al. (2009) compared three different measures 
of I/C, including one that resulted from a meta-analysis of I/C studies of the last 
twenty years (Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002). The results show that the 
average correlation between the two constructs (individualism and collctivism) is -
.25, which supports the assumption that the two constructs are seperate and 
orthogonal. It was also demonstrated via confirmatory factor analysis and using 
Triandis’ and Gelfand’s scale (1998) that a single factor solution has a quite poor fit 
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to the data, while the model assuming two different constructs (individualism and 
collctivism) with two dimensions (vertical and horizontal) generated resonable fit to 
the data (Li et al., 2007).  
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the cultural and the individual 
level of analysis and this is also the reason why a different terminology is used, when 
speaking of individualism-collectivism at the individual level: here, the term 
idiocentrism is used as the equivalent of individualism and allocentrism as the 
equivalent of collectivism (Triandis, Leung, Villareal & Clack, 1985).  
 
2.2  Measurement instruments of individualism-collectivism 
Over the past 30 years, an overabundance of instruments (mostly self-report 
scales) measuring individualism-collectivism has been published and many 
researchers have constructed their own measures of I/C for the purpose of their 
studies – despite the fact that the measurement of I/C in cross-cultural psychology is 
far from being easy. There are, however, four rather well established measures that 
are widely used in empirical studies and which have been examined for their 
psychometric quality not only by the authors themselves but also by others. Three of 
these scales have been constructed by Triandis and colleagues, all measuring 
horizontal and vertical individualism-collectivism (Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis, 
1996; Triandis et al., 1998). A general concern of these authors is what Cronbach 
(1990) called the „bandwidth versus fidelity dilemma“ (p. 208) which describes the 
fact that depending on how general or specific the operationalized construct is, a 
measurement has either a high fidelity (i.e. high consistency of the anwers it obtains) 
or a high amount of information („bandwidth“), but not both since these two aspects 
are reversely related to one another. Therefore, an intermediate level of generality of 
the construct is desirable: with individualism and collectivism being very broad 
constructs, high alphas are difficult to obtain. Their specific factors, on the other hand, 
however, do not provide enough information („bandwidth“). Therefore, according to 
Singelis et. al. (1995), the distinction of horizontal and vertical aspects of 
individualism and collectivism present the optimal level of measurement.  
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Classical items of these three scales, intended to measure horizontal 
individualism, are, for instance, „I often do ‚my own thing’ “ or „ I enjoy being 
unique and different from others“. Example items of vertical individualism are „It 
annoys me when other people do better than I do“ or „Competition is the law of 
nature“. Common horizontal collectivism items are „The well-being of my co-
workers is important to me“ and „I like sharing little things with my neighbours“. 
Vertical collectivism items regularly contained in these three scales are, for instance, 
„I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group“ or „I would do what 
pleases my family, even if I detested that activity“. 
The fourth main measurement is a scale resulting from a meta-analysis on 
various I/C-scales developed in the 1980s and 1990 (Oyserman et al., 2002). The 
authors proposed seven individualist and eight collectivist domains. Paquet et al. 
(2009) used one sample item of each domain to constuct two scales (individualism-
collectivism) and examined this measurement with regard to its psychometric 
properties. Sample items were very similar to the ones from the scales developed by 
Triandis and colleagues (see above), e.g. „I tend to do ‚my own thing’“ as an 
individualistic item. Paquet et al. (2009), however, found these two scales not to 
consistently measure one single construct. In addition to that and concerning its 
validation via confirmatory factor analysis, they report that none of the individualism 
items from the Oyserman et al. (2002) study loaded on its respective factor, hence 
there seem to be probems concerning the dimensionality of this scale (Paquet et al., 
2009). 
On the contrary to these findings, the authors – who assessed also the 
psychometric properties of the Triandis scale from 1996 (Triandis, 1996) – report 
acceptable reliabilities of the four subscales of this latter (VI, HI, VC, HC) with > 
0.7. Moreover, the correlations between the constructs supported the assumption of 
individualism-collectivism being two orthogonal and seperate dimensions instead of 
two opposite ends of single continuum (Paquet et al., 2009). In addition to that, this 
scale presented the most coherent factor structure, at least when including the 
horizontal and vertical subdimension. 
The 1998 version of the I/C scale developed by Triandis and colleagues 
(Triandis et al., 1998) was examined by Li et al. (2007) with regard to its 
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psychometric properties using confirmatory factor analysis. They found the 
conzeptualization of I/C as seperate constructs with multiple dimensions, i.e. vertical 
and horizontal aspects, to be superior to all other models (one or two factors only). To 
conclude, both of these studies confirmed the four factor structure suggested by 
Triandis and colleagues. 
 
2.3  Which role does individualism-collectivism play with regard to 
cooperation? 
There are three different approaches trying to explain the role of culture and, 
more specifically, individualism-collectivism concerning cooperation: one that 
suggests a direct relation between I/C and cooperation, one that assumes a mediating 
role and a third one stating that I/C played a moderating role. 
 
2.3.1  Is there a direct relation between I/C and cooperation? 
According to the first one, collectivists are generally more cooperative than 
individualists, that is to say culture directly affects cooperation (Mead, 1976; 
Triandis, 1990). Wagner (1995) assumed both such a direct relation between I/C and 
cooperation and a moderating role of I/C (see section 2.1.3). Concerning the direct 
relation between I/C and cooperation he argues that cooperation is in accordance with 
collectivists’ definition of the self since they privilege the pursuit of group interests, 
especially when working with in-groups of close peers or colleagues and when 
cultural traditionalism is abeted compared to modernity. He conducted an experiment 
with undergraduate students in the U.S, in which participants had to work together in 
groups for about 18-20 hours in order to analyze a case and prepare a presentation on 
this case analysis. Cooperation was measured via peer assessement and I/C via a self-
constructed questionnaire taking items from Wagner and Moch (1986), Erez and 
Earley (1987) and Triandis et al. (1988).  In this study, Wagner (1995) found the 
expected main effect of individualism-collectivism on cooperation.  
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Similarly, but defining social loafing as the opposite of cooperation, Early 
(1989) observed social loafing for individualists but not for collectivists and Matsui, 
Kukuyama and Onglacto (1987) showed that collectivists’ performance was higher 
when working  in a group than when working alone, indicating that collectivists might 
be generally more cooperative.  
Dávila de Leon et al. (2011) found collectivism but not individualism to be 
correlated with organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), attributing their finding to 
different conceptions of job demands: for collectivists, helping is part of the job and 
not an extra-role behavior. Similarly, other researchers found people holding 
collectivistic values and norms to be more likely to perform OCB (Mooreman et al., 
1995; Van Dyne, Vandevalle, Kostova, Latham & Cummings, 2000).  
However, the literature assuming a direct relation between I/C and cooperation 
is more heterogenous than it might appear from this first look: Chen et al. (2005) who 
had their participants play a two-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, found that vertical 
individualism had a negative influence on cooperative decision-making, while 
horizontal individualism had a positive effect – with neither vertical nor horizontal 
collectivism predicting cooperativeness.  
Contrary to that but investigating the relation betweet I/C and cooperation as a 
conflict resolution style, Boros et al. (2010) had their participants work together for a 
whole semester, writing a group paper for a real course and assessing their conflict 
styles and levels of individualism-collectivism via a questionnaire at the end of the 
project. They found a strong positive influence of horizontal collectivism on 
cooperation. And also Komarraju, Dollinger and Lovell (2008) found both vertical 
and horizontal collectivists to prefer an integrating (i.e. cooperating) conflict 
resolution style.  
Thus, evidence for this first approach on the relation between individualism-
collectivism and cooperation is highly inconsistent, which may – at least in part – be 
due to both the various ways of defining and operationalizing cooperation as well as 
the various ways of measuring individualism-collectivism. 
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2.3.2  Does individualism-collectivism mediate the relation between culture and 
cooperation? 
The second approach states that certain cooperation mechanisms are identical 
to some of the defining attributes of I/C, thus mediating how culture affects 
cooperation. For instance, since collectivists tend to have a stronger group identity 
and to give priority to the in-groups’ goals, they are expected to cooperate more than 
individualists. Probst, Carnevale and Triandis (1999) found vertical collectivists to 
cooperate more in a prisoner’s dilemma game when it was in the best interest of the 
group, while vertical individualists cooperated only when it was in their own best 
interest. These findings support the idea, that the relation between culture and 
cooperation is mediated by the defining attributes of cultural dimensions, in this case 
vertical aspects of I/C. Interestingly, horizontal collectivists’ as well as individualists’ 
cooperation was not affected by the difference between self and group interested – 
presumably due to the emphasis they place on equality – showing the theoretical as 
well as empirical importance of distinguishing not only individualism-collectivism 
but also its horizontal and vertical aspects.  
 
2.3.3  Does individualism-collectivism moderate the relation between culture 
and cooperation? 
While this latter conception still posits a relatively deterministic effect of 
culture on cooperation, some authors propose a third view, namely a contingency 
perspective: culture moderates the effects of various cooperation mechanisms (Chen 
et al., 1998). They argue that the effectiveness of a certain cooperation mechanism 
can be best predicted by the differences in the motive patterns of individualists and 
collectivsts. Therefore, they assume, for instance, that since affect-based trust plays 
such an important role in collectivist cultures, it should enhance cooperation there 
more than in individualistic cultures (Chen et al., 1998). Interestingly, while many 
authors argue that collectivists are more sensitive to social clues (Chen et al., 2007; 
Chen et al., 2005; Suh, 2002), at the same time many expect a number of cooperation 
mechanisms (e.g. accountability, group size, shared responsibility, task 
interdependence, etc.) – which constitute social clues as well – to have larger effects 
on individualists than on collectivists (Wagner, 1995). 
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However, such a moderating effect of I/C could be shown in a study by Probst 
et al. (1999), where vertical collectivists cooperated more, when the group outcome 
was maximazied, while vertical individualists cooperated more, when their personal 
outcome would be maximized. Likewise, in the aforementioned experiment, Wagner 
(1995) found that I/C moderated the relationship between accountability as well as 
small group size and cooperation in that accountability and group size had larger 
effects on individualists’ cooperation than on the one of collectivists. He argues that 
these two factors constrain the individualists’ leaning towards the pursuit of personal 
interest, thus „forcing“ them to cooperate. 
In a study investigating the relation between group norm and cooperation, 
Chen et al. (2007) found this relation to be moderated by idiocentrism and 
allocentrism (i.e. individualism and collectivism on an individual level, Triandis, 
1989) in that a cooperative group norm was related to more cooperation in allocentric 
people. Accordig to the authors, these findings indicate that collectivists are not more 
cooperative in general, but that they are highly sensitive to social clues. Chen et al. 
(2005) draw a similar conclusion by following Yamagishis (2003) idea of an 
institutional view of culture: the feeling of working with an in-group implies an 
informal santion system which, in return, generates more cooperation in collectivists. 
This is to say that collectivists are not intrinsically motivated to cooperate but that 
they feel obliged to do so in in-groups while individualists  - according to the authors 
– seem aloof to the situation or rather the question whether they are dealing with an 
in- or an out-group. However, as mentioned before, it appears that individualists are 
not generally independent of social clues or situational factors since they do behave 
differently accordingly to group size or the degree of accountability.  
Chatman and Barsade (1995) found both the cultural level (IC) and the 
individual level (i.e. allocentrism-idiocentrism) to be predictive of cooperation: 
Allocentric people in collectivistic situations were most cooperative, while both idio- 
and allocentric people in individualistic situations were least cooperative and 
idiocentric people in collectivistic situations were somewhat cooperative. 
To conclude, the difference between individualists and collctivists seems to lie 
rather in the fact that they react to different situational clues: collectivists’ behavior is 
guided by perceived group norms and obligations in order to maintain group 
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harmony, while individualists are guided by their personal values and beliefs, which 
apparently is synonymous with the pursuit of self-interest in many cases. 
Besides these results one must keep in mind that the miscellaneous 
instruments used to measure I/C were found to be neither completely independent nor 
entirely synonymous, hence one must be cautious in drawing cumulative conclusions 
from studies having used different measures (Wagner, 1995). 
 
3.  Reward interdependence as a means of fostering cooperation?  
 
With cooperation having been recognized to be very important to work groups 
and, therefore, to organizations, too, the question of how it could possible be fostered 
has attracted a great deal of attention. Accountability/identifiability, i.e. the question 
whether or not an individual’s contribution to task completition can be identified, has 
been investigated as a potential factor to promote cooperation (Wagner, 1995), as well 
as group size (e.g. Alencar et al., 2007; González Beltrán, 2007; Wagner, 1995),  
group identity (e.g. Chen, 1996), and communication (e.g. Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 
1994) – to name only a few among the many that have been researched. 
In organizational psychology, interdependence as a situational factor that 
might foster cooperation has also been intensively investigated. According to 
Wageman (1995) several forms of interdependence can be distinguished: task 
interdependence, process interdependence, goal interdependence and reward 
interdependence.  
Task interdependence is the „degree to which an individual’s performance 
depends upon the efforts or skills of others“ (Wageman et al., 1997, p.141), or, as Van 
der Vegt, Emans and Van De Vliert (1998) put it: „ The interconnection between 
tasks such that the performance of one definite piece of work depends on the 
completition of other definite pieces of work“ (p. 127). According to some 
researchers, it constitues the necessity of each member to take action for other 
members and has to be distinguished from resource interdependence in which each 
member can fulfill her/his part of the work alone, but resources such as information 
are shared and the group work is only complete when every member has finished 
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her/his part of the whole (Johnson & Johnson, 1989, as cited in Wageman, 1995). 
While task interdependence is a form of input interdependence (Wageman et al., 
1997), goal interdependence (i.e. the way goals are defined and achieved) and reward 
interdependence (i.e. when individual rewards are contingent on collective 
performance) constitute forms of outcome interdependence, i.e.  – in a more general 
way – a situation in which the outcome that an individual receives depends on the 
performance of the outcome of others (van der Vegt et al., 1998; Wageman, 1995).  
In this section, different kinds of reward distribution, the relation between 
reward interdependence and cooperation as well as preferences for certain reward 
distribution rules among individualists and collectivists will be depicted. 
 
3.1  Different types of reward structure and different types of rewards 
Generally, three rules according to which rewards are distributed can be 
distinguished: First, there is equity, which means that rewards are distributed among 
the members of a group as a function of the recipient’s input, performance or 
contribution to the achievement of a task. Within this norm, a series of different rules 
exist, depending on the definition of „contribution“: this may be education, job 
responsibility, seniority, or – the most important one in organizations – job 
performance. According to the equality rule, rewards are devided equally among all 
members, disregarding the respective contribution of each member. And following 
the need-based allocation rule, rewards are allocated according to members’ needs 
(He, Chen & Zhang, 2004).  
In addition to that, allocation rules can be distinguished into two different 
types, according to whether they increase status differences between the recipients of 
the rewards (so called „differential rules“) or whether they reduce such differences (so 
called „equalitarian rules“) (He et al., 2004). While equity rules tend to be differential 
(e.g. rewards based on performance, job position or job-related needs), equality rules 
tend to be more equalitarian (e.g. rules based on personal needs, equality among 
individuals or across groups) (Martin & Harder, 1994).  
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Concerning the types of rewards to be allocated Martin et al. (1994) 
distinguished between financial and socioemotional rewards. Following this 
distinction, monetary/ material and socioemotional rewards have been systematically 
investigated (Chen, 1995).  
Furthermore, while some studies examine solely preferences for certain 
reward allocation rules, i.e. where recipients of a reward are asked to indicate what 
kind of reward structure they prefered (He et al., 2004), most others focus on reward 
allocation behavior, that is to say on the allocators of a reward who may or may not 
be recipient of this given reward at the same time (Chen, 1995; Chen, Meindl & Hui, 
1998; Fischer & Smith, 2003; McLean Parks, Conlon, Ang & Bontempo, 1999). 
3.2  The role of reward structure in fostering cooperation  
As mentioned above, two types of structural interdependence can be 
distinguished: task and reward interdependence (Wageman, 2001). While task 
interdependence, i.e. the necessity to work together in order to accomplish a task, as a 
form of input interdependence has been investigated relatively extensively with 
regard to its potential to promote cooperation (Allen, et al., 2003; Van Der Veg et al., 
1998; Wageman, 1995; Wageman et al., 1997), less attention has been paid to reward 
interdependence as as form of outcome interdependence. 
The findings on the effect of reward interdependence on cooperative behavior 
are very miscellaneous and one main problem in assessing the role of reward 
interdependence as a cooperation mechanism is the seperation of task and reward 
interdependence: Creating a scenario or a situation in which a group of people 
working together, but where every member can fulfill his/her task without the others, 
and where yet the reward for this task will be allocated to each member equally, is far 
from being easy. Earlier studies, both experimental research and field studies, 
(Campion, 1996; Pritchard, Jones, Roth, Stuebig & Ekeberg, 1988) that found 
increased cooperation under conditions of reward interdependence and that did not 
make this distinction, could therefore not make clear if the results found were due to 
task or reward interdependence or both of them (DeMatteo, Eby & Sundstrom, 1998; 
Van der Vegt & Van de Vliert, 2002). For instance, results of a field study conducted 
 30 
on 270 supervisor-employee dyades using questionnaires suggest that both task and 
reward interdependence are positively and significantly related to OCB, with the 
relation between task interdependence and OCB being stronger. However, both of 
these relations were fully mediated by group cohesion (Chen, Tang & Wang, 2009). 
Early studies that did make the distinction between task and reward 
interdependence (Leibowitz & Tollison, 1980, as cited in Van de Vegt et al., 2002) 
found that high outcome interdependence produced free-riding when task 
interdependence was low, thus showing an interaction effect between the two. 
Similarly, but outside the laboratory, Wageman (1995) seperated task from reward 
interdependence and manipulated group, individual and hybrid tasks and rewards in a 
large U.S. corporation, that is to say she used a 3x3-design in order to asses the 
differential effects of both kinds of interdependence. In doing so, she demonstrated 
that groups performed best when there was congruency between task and reward 
structure. However, according to this study, it was task interdependence that was 
related to cooperation, while reward interdependence was related to effort.  
This result was later confirmed in a laboratory experiment (Wageman et al., 
1997) where pairs of participants had to correct three types of errors in an article 
(general errors, reference errors or errors in tables and headers). Again, three levels of 
task and reward interdependence were created (high, low and moderate): These pairs 
of participants were first trained in APA format – one for references and the other one 
for tables, headers and equations – and informed about the proportion of the types of 
errors in their respective articels, which was varied, thus creating task 
interdependence. Reward interdependence was manipulated by varying the pay-off 
scheme, i.e. they either received 50 Cent for each error corrected on their own articel 
or 25 Cent for each error corrected on their own or their partner’s sheet or 35 Cent for 
errors on their own and 15 Cent for errors on their partner’s sheet. Between the 
training and the task they were given three minutes during which they had the 
opportunity to cooperate in any way (e.g. trade training sheets, teach each other what 
they had learnt or agree to exchange articles after a certain time). Here, again, it was 
task interdependence that led to increased cooperation, while it was reward 
interdependence that was important to performance, but not to cooperation – neither 
to the extent nor to the nature of cooperative strategies. 
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This procedure was adopted by Allen et al. (2003) who distiguished only 
between high and low task/reward interdependence, thus using a 2x2 design. Their 
results confirmed the earlier findings of Wageman et al. (1997): perceived helping 
behavior as one aspect of cooperative behavior was higher, when task 
interdependence was high and this regardless of the level of reward interdependence.  
It might seem logical, however, that not only task interdependence increases 
cooperation but also reward interdependence since the latter creates a sense of 
common fate and should therefore lead to more motivation to cooperate (Fan & 
Gruenfeld, 1998).  
And, referring to the two studies mentioned above, Moser & Wodzicki (2007) 
point out that given that working in the high task interdependence conditon required 
more interaction between group members and was perceived as more complex, this 
condition was not comparable to the low task interdependence condition with regard 
to task difficulty. In addition to that, they critise that in the settings used above (Allen 
et al., 2003; Wageman et al., 1997) high rewards depended directly on cooperation in 
the high task interdependence conditon, which may have caused ceiling effects in the 
dependent variables (Moser et al., 2007) while in the low task interdependence 
conditon participants could not influence the other members’ performance, thus 
reward interdependence could not serve as an additional motivator to cooperate. To 
conclude, the operationalization of the two types of interdependence was not 
completely independent and, therefore, the effect that is exclusively due to reward 
interdependence could not be examined in theses designs. 
In order to remedy these insufficiencies, Moser et al. (2007) designed a 
university-based scenario permitting to investigate the solely effect of reward 
interdependence on cooperation intentions by completely excluding any kind of task 
interdependence (Moser et al., 2007). Using vignettes for manipulating reward 
interdependence (low vs. high) and questionnaires in order to assess the intention to 
cooperate as the dependent variable on a sample of 28 undergraduate and graduate 
students at the University of Zurich, their results indicate that willingness to help and 
to share information are higher under high than low reward interdependence. 
Consequently, this study provides preliminary evidence that not only task, but also 
reward interdependence can serve as a means of fostering cooperation intentions – at 
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least when cooperation is an option and not necessary to fulfill the task as it is the 
case for high task interdependence. 
However, in this context, it is noteworthy that the relation between 
cooperation and the means of fostering it becomes tautologic or at least intertwined in 
the case where cooperation is defined as positively related goals (e.g. Deutsch, 1986) 
and reward/goal interdependence as a means of fostering these positively related 
goals: Cooperation and goal structure then become synonymous with each other 
(Yifeng & Tjosvold, 2008). Therefore and for the purpose of this study, cooperation 
in terms of interrelated goals will not be considered as a definition. 
3.3  Reward-allocation preferences and individualism – collectivism  
Reward-allocation preference denotes the attitude (both of a recipient or an 
allocator) toward various rules concerning their appropriateness for the allocation of a 
given reward (Leventhal, Karuza & Frey, 1980, as cited in He et al., 2004). This 
attitude needs to be distinguished from reward-allocation behavior, which designates 
only the allocator’s behavior (e.g. Chen et al., 1998; Fischer et al., 2003; McLean 
Parks et al., 1999; Sama & Papamarcos, 2000), thus not taking into account the 
recipient. The reward – allocation preference oftenly also reflects the distributive 
justice norm prevalent in an organization (He et al., 2004).  
With equity rules rewarding individual performance and contribution and with 
individualists focusing on individual goals and achievement, it may be assumed that 
individualists prefer equity-based reward allocation. Collectivists, on the contrary, can 
be expected to prefer equality-based rules (e.g. Hui, Triandis & Yee, 1991, as cited in 
Chen, Chen & Meindl, 1997) since they are considered to be more concerned with the 
goals and the wellfare of their group than with their individual interests (Triandis, 
1995) and fear differential rewards that enlarge status differences among group 
members (Reis, 1984) which, thus, might disturb group harmony. This hypothesis, 
however, was not confirmed (e.g. McLean et al., 1999) and appears to be overly 
simplistic. 
Since collectivists tend to make a very clear distinction in their behavior 
between in-group and out-group members – in contrast to individualists who treat all 
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in a rather similiar way –, other studies expected collectivists to prefer equalitarian 
rules for in-group members, but differential rules for out-group members. This 
hypothesis was confirmed – with collectivists’ preference for differential rules for 
out-group members being even stronger than individualists’ ones (Leung & Bond, 
1984). Similarly, Sama et al. (2000) found in a meta-analysis examining eleven 
studies published between 1982 and 1992, that collectivists prefered equality- or 
need-based reward allocation rules for in-group members and equity with out-group 
members, while individualists generally prefered equity-based reward allocation. 
Hence, the relationship between I/C and reward-allocation preferences was moderated 
by whether in- or out-group members were involved.  
Another possible distinction constitutes the type of reward being allocated: 
Chen (1995) found Chinese employees to prefer equity rules over equality rules for 
both material and socioemotional rewards, thus being rather economically oriented. 
U.S. employees, on the contrary, seemed more humanistically oriented, prefering 
equity rules only for material rewards and equality rules for socioemotional ones. 
More recent studies, however, taking into account the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions of collectivism, found vertical collectivists to prefer equity rules and 
horizontal collectivists to prefer equality rules (Che et al., 1997; He et al., 2004: here, 
the effect of vertical collectivism on differential preferences was, however, mediated 
through productivity orientation, while the effect of horizontal collectivism on 
equalitarian preferences was not.).   
A meta-analysis examining reward allocation behavior across different 
cultures conducted by Fischer et al. (2003) even comes to the conclusion that it is 
Schwartz’ hierarchy and Hofstede’s power distance dimension that best explain cross-
cultural differnces, while individualism-collectivism is not related to effect sizes. 
Given these highly ambigious results, Fadil et al. (2005), conceptually 
examined the role of individualism-collectivism in the cross-cultural applicability of 
equity-theory. They come to conclude that by focusing on the cognitive views of the 
receiving subordinates concerning equity and equality (rather than on the managerers’ 
allocation decisions) will enable empirical research to provide valuable insight in the 
cross-cultural application of equity-theory. 
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However, there are no studies so far that examine the role of cultural 
orientation (i.e. individualism-collectivism) in the relation between reward 
interdependence and cooperation.  
 
4.  Current study 
4.1  Research question and hypothesis 
Studies conducted in Western countries found that reward interdependence 
lead to more cooperative behavior (Moser & Wodzicki, 2007), thus it can be a 
mechanism for fostering cooperation in individualistic cultures. Literature examining 
the influence of culture on coopeartive behavior, focusing on individualism-
collectivism arrives at the conclusion that collectivists are not generally more 
cooperative than individualists, but that the extent to which they cooperate depends on 
whether they work with in-group or out-group members (Chen et al., 2005; Early, 
1989) 
Assuming that culture plays a moderating role (Chen et al., 1998) concerning the 
way how possible cooperation mechanisms influence cooperative behavior and that 
one main aspect of collectivism-individualism is the extent to which people draw 
distinctions between in-group and out-group members (James, 1993; Probst et al., 
1999), this study asseses the question if the effectiveness of reward interdependence 
as a means of fostering cooperation is moderated by culture, i.e. individualism-
collectivism. It is hypothesized that, first, since individualists do not draw a 
distinction in their behavior dependent on whether they work with in- or out-group 
memebers, the extent to which they cooperate will be influenced by the reward 
structure, i.e. they will cooperate more in situations of reward interdependence than 
when rewards are distributed according to the equity rule. Second, since collectivists 
make a clear distinction between in-group and out-group members, this aspect will 
guide their behavior more than the reward structure, thus, when working with in-
group members, the extend to which they will cooperate does not depend on the 
structure of the reward allocated to the group. 
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4.2   Method 
4.2.1 Sample and procedure 
The sample consisted of 269 psychology students from the University of 
Vienna (199 females and70 males) with an average age of 23.4 (ranging from 18 to 
51; SD= 3.8)  and 269 Chinese and foreign language students from the University of 
Qingdao, province Shandong, China (229 females and 40 males) with an average age 
of 22.1 (ranging from 19 to 40; SD= 1.78). A sample from China was chosen because 
according to Hofstede (1980) and Oyserman (2002), people there show large effects 
with reagrd to I/C, that is to say they score low on individualism and high on 
collectivism. Chinese were not expected to be collectivists per se on a cultural level as 
suggested by Hofstede (1980), hence the aim was not to compare Chinese versus 
Austrians (who generally may be expected to be rather individualistic) when testing 
the hypothesis. The inclusion of Chinese participants in the study rather served the 
purpose to increase variability in the sample when measuring I/C on an individual 
level.  
 
4.2.2  Vignettes and manipulation check  
Reward interdependence was manipulated using two versions of a vignette 
describing a university seminar scenario adapted from Moser and Wodzicki (2007). In 
these latter, participants were asked to imagine that for the purpose of the seminar, 
they had to write a term paper and give a presentation on a certain topic, working in a 
group with two other students. This necessitated a previous literature research. By 
indicating that this project would last for the whole semester, a long-term perspective 
was introduced in order to create an ingroup-feeling. In order to seperate reward from 
task interdependence, it was stressed that they were free to choose whether they 
wanted to do this literature research together or by themselves. In one of the scenarios 
it was highlightened that marks for both the presentation and the term paper were 
group-based, i.e. all members of a group would get the same mark, independently of 
their respective contribution (reward interdependence). In the other version, on the 
contrary, it was pointed out that group members would get their marks individually, 
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contingent on their respective contribution to the presentation and the term paper (no 
reward interdependence). 
After having read the vingette, participants were then asked to answer four 
questions on how they perceived the described situation with regard to task 
interdependence and another three on whether or not they perceived reward 
interdependence in the scenario. Example items in this manipulation check were „We 
have to closely coordinate our work in order to work effectively“ (task 
interdependence) or „My mark for the presentation and the term paper is primarily 
dependent on the evaluation of the group as a whole“ (reward interdependence). 
Answers were rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (absolutely not 
true) to 4 (absolutely true). 
4.2.3  Measures 
Cooperation. In order to assess the intention to cooperate as the dependent 
variable, questions from Moser et al. (2007) were adapted and additional items were 
constructed. Example items were „One of your group members is not sure if she/he 
cited correctly in her/his part of the term paper and askes you to proofread it with 
regard to citation rules. How likely is it that you tell her/him that you have much to do 
yourself anyway and that it is not your task to do her/his work?“ or „During literature 
research you find an article that might be relevant to another group memeber’s work. 
How likely is it that you pass it on to her/him?“. This scale contained 16 items and 
answers were rated on a 5-point-Likert scale ranging from 0 (very unlikely) to 4 (very 
likely). 
Individualism-collectivism. Items were taken from the Horizontal and Vertical 
Individualism and Collectivism scale developed by Triandis (1996) which Paquet et 
al. (2009), who compared three I/C-measures, deemed the best measure of the 
constructs. The horizontal individualism subscale originally contained seven items 
and had a reliability of =.81, the vertical individualism subscale originally contained 
eight items and had a reliability of =.82, the horizonal collectivism subscale 
originally contained eight items and had a reliability of =.80, and the vertical 
collectivism subscale originally contained eight items and had a reliability of =.73. 
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Some of these items were adapted and additional ones were constructed in 
order to make them easier to understand and more applicable to a university setting. 
For instance, the item „I like sharing little things with my neighbours“ was 
reformulated and split into two items: „I like sharing little things with my fellow 
students“ and „I like sharing little things with my friends“. In the item „It is important 
to me to respect the decisions made by my groups“ for instance, it was added in the 
end „e.g. friends, colleagues, etc.“ to make the reference point clearer. The horizontal 
and the vertical individualism subscales then still contained seven and eigth items 
respectively, the horizonal collectivism subscale was expanded to nine items and the 
vertical collectivism subscale was reduced to seven items. 
 
4.2.4  Pretest and translation procedure   
A pretest was contucted on a sample of 40 psychology students from the 
University of Vienna in order to assess the quality of the measures. Reliability of the 
cooperation scale showed nonsatisfying results with  = .68, even after eliminating 
five out of eleven items. The same held true for two out of the four I/C – scales with  
= .52 for the VC – scale (after eliminating two items), an = .68 for the HI – scale 
(also after eliminating two items). The reliabilities of the HC – and and the VI – scale 
where satisfying with = .75 (also after eliminating two items) and = .80 
respectively.  
Therefore, as mentioned above, both for the scale on individualism-
collectivism and the one on cooperation, additional items were constructed and some 
other items were restated, thus ensuring their applicability to the university context.  
For the administration of this final questionnaire on the Chinese sample, it was 
then translated by two independent Chinese native speakers and these two versions 
were then compared by a third translator, a German native speaker who is fluent in 
Chinese and who established a final translation out of these two previous translations 
with regard to the original phrasing in German. 
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4.3  Results 
4.3.1  Psychometric properties of the measures  
Both the cooperation measure and the four scales measuring vertical and 
horizontal aspects of individualism-collectivism where assessed with respect to their 
factor structure and their reliabilities for each sample seperately. This was necessary 
in order to test measurement equivalence, that is to say check whether the scales 
measured the same constructs in China and in Austria. 
Cooperation scale. Given that, first, it is not a well established measure yet 
and that, secondly, additional items where constructed after the pretest, principal 
component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 16 items with orthogonal rotation 
(varimax) – and this for the Austrian and the Chinese sample seperately in order to 
examine whether there was the same factor structure in both samples.  
The sampling adequacy for the analysis was verified by the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure, KMO = .59 (Austria) and KMO = .71 (China), hence, both being 
above the acceptable limit of .5. According to Bartlett’s test of sphericity the 
correlations between the items were sufficiently large to conduct PCA with χ2 (120) = 
575.53, p < .001 (China) and χ2 (120) = 521.54,  p < .001 (Austria). 
 
The screeplot, which can be used for factor extraction with 200 or more 
participants (Field, 2009) – for the Chinese as well as for the Austrian sample – 
clearly suggested a one factor solution (see figure 1 and 2 below). However, this first 
factor in both sample accounts for only for 19.5 and 15.8 of the total variance 
respectively and 6 (respectively 7) factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were being 
extracted. 
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Figure 1 – One factor solution for the cooperation 
scale in the Chinese sample 
Figure 2 – One factor solution for the cooperation 
scale in the Austrian sample 
 
Prinicpal component analysis thus reveals that the factore structure of the 
cooperation scale is similar in both the Austrian and the Chinese sample. Therefore, 
the assessement of the scale with regard to its reliability was conducted on the whole 
sample, not seperating the Chinese from the Austrian parts of the sample. Using all 16 
items, Cronbach’s Alpha was only = .40. After elimininating items in several steps, 
reliability of = .64 was reached with eight items remaining in the final scale. 
 
Individualism-collectivism. Unrotated principal component analysis (PCA) 
was conducted on the 31 items– and this for the Austrian and the Chinese sample 
seperately in order to examine whether there was the same factor structure in both 
samples.  
The sampling adequacy for the analysis was verified by the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure, KMO = .73 (China) and KMO = .72 (Austria), hence, both being 
above the acceptable limit of .5. According to Bartlett’s test of sphericity the 
correlations between the items were sufficiently large to conduct PCA with χ2(465) = 
1975,78, p < .001 (China) and χ2 (465) = 1818,96,  p < .001 (Austria). 
 
The screeplot, which can be used for factor extraction with 200 or more 
participants (Field, 2009) suggested a four factor solution for the Chinese sample and 
a three factor solution for the Austrian sample (see figure 3 and 4 below). These 
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factors account for 38.1 and 30.5 of the total variance respectively and 10  factors 
with eigenvalues greater than 1 were being extracted (in both samples). 
  
Figure 3 – Four factor solution for the I/C scale 
in the Chinese sample 
Figure 4 – Three factor solution for the I/C scale in 
the Austrian sample 
 
Given that there was a different number of factors for the two samples, factor 
loadings of the itmes were closely examined.  
For the Chinese sample, this revealed that all of the horizontal collectivism 
items had loadings greater than .4 on the first factor which accounted for 16.0 percent 
of the total variance. On the second factor, 5 out of the 7 horizontal individualism 
items had loadings greater than .4 with this factor accounting for 10.0 percent of the 
total variance. On the third factor, three vertical collectivism and three vertical 
individualism items had loadings greater than .4, with this factor accounting for only 
6.5 percent of the total variance. The fourth factor accounted for 5.5 percent of the 
total variance and only HC – item had a factor loading greater.4  
Thus, while the first two factors seem to reflect collectivistic and 
individualistic aspects of a horizontal orientation, the third factor globally reflects 
both collectivistic and individualistic aspects of a vertical orientation.  
For the Austrian sample, this revealed that seven out of the eight vertical 
individualism items had loadings greater than .4 on the first factor which accounted 
for 14.2 percent of the total variance. On the second factor, three horizontal 
individualism items and two horizontal collectivistic items had loadings greater than 
.4 with this factor accounting for 8.7 percent of the total variance. On the third factor, 
three vertical individualism and one vertical collectivism item had loadings greater 
than .4, with this factor accounting for 7.6 percent of the total variance. Thus, in the 
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Austrian sample, while the first factor seems to represent vertical individualism, the 
second one contains mostly horizontal and the third one mostly vertical items. 
To conclude, the factor structure between the two samples not only differs 
with regard to the number of factors but also with regard to what the factors represent. 
Concerning the scales’ reliabilities, these were, again, assessed for both 
samples separately since the items might not correlate in the same way in both 
cultures and thus not form scales (Hofstede, 1980). 
Chinese sample. Cronbach’s Alpha for the vertical individualism scale was 
=. 51  when all of the originally eight items were included. Reducing the scale to 5 
items increased it only to =. 59. (Items VI 8, VI 2 and VI 5 were eliminated). 
Reliability for the vertical collectivism scale was only =.46 when all of the 
originally seven items where included. Reducing the scale to 5 items increased it only 
to =. 59. (Items VC 2 and VC 3 were eliminated). As for the horizontal 
individualism scale, Cronbach’s Alpha including all seven items was =.65 which 
increased to =. 73 when items HI 1 and HI 4 were excluded. All nine items of the 
horizontal collectivism scale were retained with =. 79. 
Austrian sample. All eight items of the vertical individualism scale were 
retained with =. 78 and further item elimination did not increase it anymore. 
Reliabiliy for the vertical collectivism scale was only =.50 when all of the originally 
seven items where included and exclusion of items did not increase the reliability 
either. As for the horizontal individualism scale, Cronbach’s Alpha including all 
seven items was =.66 which increased to =. 68 when item HI 1 was excluded. 
Elimination of item HC 4 increased the reliability of the horizontal collectivism scale 
from =. 67 only to =. 68. 
However, since a scale needed to be constructed to measure I/C in both 
samples, reliabilities for the whole sample were calculated as well. The resulting 
Cronbach’s Alphas for the four scales were =.75 for VI (after eliminating VI 3 and 
VI 1), =. 56 for VC (after eliminating VC 2 and VC 1), =. 68 for HI (after 
eliminating HI 1 and HI 4), and =.72 for HC with no item being excluded. 
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4.3.2 Descriptive statistics  
Cooperation. The mean for the cooperation scale in the Chinese sample was 
slightly lower (M= 2.39; SD= 0.39) than in the Austrian sample (M= 3.03; SD= 0.47). 
Though this difference was significant t(520)= - 17,13, p< .01., the effect was very 
small. 
Individualism-collectivism. The mean for the vertical individualism scale was 
higher in the Chinese than in the Austrian sample (M= 2.34; SD= 0.47 and M= 1.42; 
SD= 0.71 respectively). This was also the case for the vertical collectivism scale 
where the mean was higher in the Chinese than in the Austrian sample (M= 2.36; SD= 
0.39 and M= 1.83; SD= 0.52 respectively). With Levene’s test being signifigant for 
both these constructs, homogenity of variances lacked and t-test could not be 
interpreted. 
On the horizontal scales, however, the opposite held true: here, Austrians 
scored on average higher than Chinese, both on horizontal individualism (M= 2.73; 
SD=. 65 and M= 2.63; SD= 0.68 respectively) and on horizontal collectivism (M= 
3.09; SD= 0.44 and M=3.01; SD= 0.45 respectively). Though these differences were 
significant (for the HI – score t(530)= - 1,77, p< .05 and t(524)= -2,12, p<.05 for the 
HC – score) the effects were very small. 
 
4.3.3 Manipulation check  
Two-way ANOVA (country x reward interdependence condition) was 
conducted to check whether the reward interdependence manipulation had been 
successful. With post-hoc Levene’s test being significant, homogenity of variances 
was not fulfiled and significant main or interaction effects could not be interpreted. 
However, from the means certain tendencies became obvious: In the Austrian sample 
the manipulation appeared to have been succesful with participants in the reward 
interdependence condition scoring generally significantly higher than their 
counterparts in the no – reward interdependence condition (M= 2.90; SD= 0.59 and 
M=1.50; SD=0.80 rspectively). In the Chinese sample, on the contrary, difference of 
means between the reward interdependence condition and the no – reward 
interdependence condition (M= 2.45; SD= 0.60 and M=2.37; SD=0.57 respectively) 
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was almost not existent, hence indicating that some of the participants had not 
understood the manipulation (see figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 – Peceived reward interdependence in the two 
conditions in China and Austria 
 
In order to determine more exactely – and exclude – those participants where 
the manipulation had not been successful, the score of the perceived reward 
interdependence was linked to the actual condition. That is to say only those in the RI 
– condition with a score of perceived reward interdependence above 2.25 and those in 
the no – RI – condition with such a score below 1.57 (i.e. about half a SD below and 
above the theoretical mean of 2.0) were included. This resulted in a distribution of 
cases over the two conditions and two samples as shown in table 1 below. 
Table 1- Sample sizes before and after the manipulation check 
 
Condition Total 
Country 
 
Reward 
interdependence 
No Reward 
interdependence 
 
China 
8 
(131) 
60 
(135) 
68 
(266) 
% of total 
3.4% 25.3% 28.7% 
Austria 
64 
(131) 
105 
(135) 
169 
(266) 
% of total 
27.0% 44.3% 71.3% 
Total 
 72 
(262) 
165 
(270) 
237 
(532) 
 30.4% 69.6%  
N.B.: Numbers in brackets indicate the size of the (sub-) sample before the manipulation check 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
No RI RI
China
Austria
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From this it is obvious that what gave cause for concern were the Chinese 
participants in the N RI – condition with only eight cases left. On the one hand, such a 
small size of a subsample makes inference statistical analysis actually impossible. 
But, on the other hand, using the whole sample, i.e. including those who were not 
aware of the manipulation, renders the manipulation in itself obsolete. Hence, in the 
following section, both hypotheses will be tested twice: once using the whole sample, 
once only including the cases in which manipulation was successful. 
 
4.3.4 Hypotheses testing 
The two hypotheses suggest individualism-collectivism to affect the strength 
of the relation between reward interdependence as the predictor and cooperation 
intentions as the criterion variable, that is to say I/C is a moderator. With 
individualism-collectivism being not one continuum but two (or rather four) distinct 
dimensions, every participant’s score on each of the four scales (i.e. horizontal 
individualism, vertical individualism, horizontal collectivism and vertical 
collectivism) was calculated. Since answers had been measured on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from 0 to 4, it was defined a cut-off point, that is to say that a person 
scoring above two on one of these four scales would be considered as falling into this 
category. For instance, a participant with a score of 2.5 on the horizontal 
individualism scale would be considered a horizontal individualist, while a person 
with a score of 1.5 would be considered not to be a horizontal individualist. Thus, 
with each of the two (respectively four) I/C – dimensions being split into two groups, 
and with type of reward allocation being a dichotomous variable, according to Baron 
and Kenny (1986), a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA could be conducted in order to test 
the two hypotheses. Sex was included as a covariate to account for possible effects of 
the uneven sex distribution. 
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Including the whole sample disregarding the manipulation check results 
Horizonal aspects of individualism/collectivism as a moderator to the relation 
between reward interdependence and cooperation: 
There was a non-significant three-way interaction effect of horizontal 
collectivism, horizontal individualism and reward interdependence on cooperation, F 
(1, 498)= .04, p> .05, partial η2= .00. In addition, none of the two-way interactions 
was significant (horizontal collectivism and horizontal individualism on cooperation, 
F (1, 498)= .26, p> .05, partial η2= .001; horizontal individualism and reward 
interdependence on cooperation, F (1, 498)= .31, p> .05, partial η2= .001; horizontal 
collectivism and reward interdependence on cooperation, F (1, 498)= 2.06, p> .05, 
partial η2= .004.). However, there was a significant main effect of horizontal 
collectivism, F (1, 497)= 11.99, p< .05, partial η2= .02, which could be interpreted 
given that the interaction effects were not significant (Bortz & Döring, 2002): those 
participants scoring high on horizontal collectivism cooperated significantly more 
(M= 2.73; SD=.53) than those scoring low (M= 2.16; SD=.52). Yet, this effect was 
very small. 
 
Vertical aspects of individualism/collectivism as a moderator to the relation between 
reward interdependence and cooperation: 
There was a non-significant three-way interaction effect of vertical 
collectivism, vertical individualism and reward interdependence on cooperation, F (1, 
497)= 1.02, p> .05, partial η2= .002. The two-way interaction of vertical collectivism 
and vertical individualism on cooperation was non-significant as well, F (1, 497)= 
.34, p> .05, partial η2= .001, as was the two-way interaction of reward 
interdependence and vertical individualism on cooperation, F (1, 497)= .002, p> .05, 
partial η2= .00. However, there was a significant hybrid two-way interaction of reward 
interdependence and vertical collectivism on cooperation, F (1, 497)= 4.00, p< .05, 
partial η2= .01. (See figures 6 and 7) That is to say that those who scored low on 
vertical collectivism (VC) cooperated significantly more in the reward 
interdependence condition than in the no – reward interdependence condition, while 
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those scoring high on VC cooperated approximately to the same extent in both 
conditions. This effect was, however, extremely small.  
  
Figure 6 – Significant two-way interaction effect of 
vertical collectivism and reward interdependence 
condition (I) 
Figure 7 – Significant two-way interaction effect 
of vertical collectivism and reward 
interdependence condition (II) 
 
In addition, there was a significant main effect of vertical individualism, F (1, 
497)= 69.83, p< .05, partial η2= .12, with those participants scoring low on vertical 
individualism cooperating significantly more (M= 2.91; SD=.48) than those scoring 
high (M= 2.50; SD=.51). However, this effect was, again, very small. 
 
Including only those participants for whom the manipulation was successful 
Horizonal aspects of individualism/collectivism as a moderator to the relation 
between reward interdependence and cooperation: 
The three-way interaction of horizontal collectivism, horizontal individualism 
and reward interdependence on cooperation could not be calculated since there where 
no participants who scored low both on horizontal collectivism and horizontal 
individualism. Thus, with one subgroup missing, three-way interaction could not be 
assessed (Bortz et al., 2002). In addition, none of the three two-way interactions was 
significant (horizontal collectivism and horizontal individualism on cooperation, F (1, 
415)= .04, p> .05, partial η2= .00; horizontal collectivism and reward interdependence 
on cooperation, F (1, 415)= .02, p> .05, partial η2= .00; horizontal individualism and 
reward interdependence on cooperation, F (1, 415)= .01, p> .05, partial η2= .00). 
Therefore, the interpretation of the main effect of horizontal collectivism was feasible, 
F (1, 415)= 8.12, p< .05, partial η2= .02. Those scoring high on horizontal 
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collectivism cooperated significantly more than those scoring low. This effect was, 
however, extremely small. 
 
Vertical aspects of individualism/collectivism as a moderator to the relation between 
reward interdependence and cooperation: 
There was a non-significant three-way interaction effect of vertical 
collectivism, vertical individualism and reward interdependence on cooperation, F (1, 
412)= 2.45, p> .05, partial η2= .01. However, there was a significant hybrid two-way 
interaction of reward interdependence and vertical individualism on cooperation, F (1, 
412)= 4.86, p< .05, partial η2= .01, which shows that while the exent to which those 
scoring low on vertical individualism was high in both conditions (reward 
interdependence versus no – reward interdependence), those scoring high on vertical 
individualism cooperated significantly less in the reward interdependence condition 
than in the NRI-condition. (See figures 8 and 9) 
  
Figure 8 – Significant two-way interaction effect of 
vertical individualism and reward interdependence 
condition (I) 
Figure 9 – Significant two-way interaction effect 
of vertical individualism and reward 
interdependence condition (II) 
 
Since the interaction is hybride, the main effects of these two factors cannot be 
interpreted (Bortz et al., 2002). However, there also was a main effect of the third 
factor, vertical collectivism (F (1, 412)= 2.10, p< .05, partial η2= .02) with those 
scoring low on VC cooperating significantly more (M= 2.91; SD=.43) than those 
scoring high (M=2.60; SD= .51). Again, the effect was extremely small. 
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Table 2 – Summary of results 
 
Whole sample Manipulation check successful 
Horizontal I/C Main effect of HC Main effect of HC 
Vertical I/C - Interaction of VC and RI 
- Main effect of VI 
- Interaction of VI and RI 
- Main effect of VC 
 
5. Discussion  
5.1  Summary of results 
It was hypothezised that individualism-collectivism would have a moderating 
effect on the relation between reward structure and cooperation. However, no support 
was found in the results. Both when including the whole sample and when 
considering only those cases where the manipulation had been successful, there was a 
main effect, however, of horizontal collectivism, suggesting that horizontal 
collectivists cooperate more than those people who cannot be considered HC. Thus 
there seems to be a direct relation between HC and cooperation, just as it is assumed 
in some parts of the literature (e.g. Wagner, 1995). Also, it seems noteworthy, that on 
the horizontal dimension of I/C, reward structure did not play a role at all with 
relation to cooperation.  
The results comparing individualism and collectivism in its vertical 
dimensions with regard to reward structure where inconsistent between the sample as 
a whole and the part where the manipulation check had been successful: in the former, 
the interaction between reward structure and vertical collectivism was significant, 
showing that the reward structure had a greater effect on those scoring low on VC 
than those who can be considered vertical collectivists. Thus, it appears that VC is 
rather a hindrance when using reward structure as a means to foster cooperation. In 
this part of the sample, a main effect was found for vertical individualism, with 
participants scoring low on VI cooperating significantly more than those who can be 
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considered vertical individualists. Hence, here it is vertical individualism that appears 
to be generally hindering cooperation. 
In the latter part of the sample, on the contrary, the opposite results were 
found: reward structure interacted with vertical individualism in that vertical 
individualists cooperated significantly less in the reward interdependence condition 
than in the NRI-condition, while the amount of cooperation of those scoring low on 
VI was the same in both conditions – which was also above the VI’s ones. This was 
somewhat unexpected since it suggests that reward interdependence has a negative 
effect on vertical individualists with regard to cooperation. The main effect of VC 
found in this part of the sample was, on the contrary, less surprising, suggesting that 
vertical collectivists cooperate generally more than those who have no VC-
orientation. 
However confusing these results may seem, a possible explanation might be 
that – instead of considering I/C – it is vertical orientations that rather hinder the use 
of reward interdependence as a means of promoting cooperation. 
Another possible explanation for the fact that I/C had no mediating effect on 
the relation between reward interdependence and cooperation may be that though 
collectivists’ behavior was expected to be influenced more by the fact that they were 
dealing with ingroup members than by the reward structure (thus showing no 
difference in the amount of cooperation), it might as well be possible that since 
collectivists are said to be more sensitive to situational clues, they may have reacted 
more to reward structure than expected – thus covering the effect of the in-group/ out-
group distinction. 
Even though there is a lot of research that supports the hypothesis according to 
which I/C are rather two distinct dimensions instead of two opposite points of a single 
continuum, with regard to the vertical aspects of I/C, the findings from both parts of 
the sample rather suggest that those scoring low on VI and those scoring high on VC 
cooperate more – as if low (vertical) individualism was equivalent to high (vertical) 
collectivism. 
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5.2  Strengths and limitations    
The first main limitation of the study is that both the Austrian and the Chinese 
sample consisted of undergraduate students, thus the results found cannot be 
generalized to the whole population. The fact that college students are not 
representative of the whole population – especially not in China, where only a very 
small percentage of an age-group gets into university via a highly competitive 
nationwide entry exam (gaokao 高考) –may also have influenced the outcome of the 
I/C-scales: Chinese did not appear to be more collectivistic than their Austrian 
counterparts. Rather they appeared to be more vertical. However, when looking at the 
items measuring vertical individualism and collectivism (e.g. „ Without competition, 
it is not possible to have a good society“ and „Self-sacrifice is virtue“ respectiviely) 
another interpretation is that this result reflects what is socially desirable in both 
countries rather than the participants’ actual attitudes. Competing openly may be 
socially more accepted in China than it is in Austria. 
With regard to the miscellaneous results concerning the vertical aspects of I/C, 
one major limitation of the current study is that this may be due to measurement 
problems given that the reliabilty for the VC-scale was dramatically low ( =. 56). 
This apparent difficulty in assessing vertical collectivism (while the other three scales 
show satisfactory reliabilities) not only is a problem in the current study but also in 
many others (Boros et al., 2009, Chen et al., 2005). The question is whether this is 
due to the fact that the respective items concern questions that risk being socially 
desireable and may therefore be biased (e.g. „We should keep our aging parents with 
us at home“, Triandis, 1996). Or does the construct of vertical collectivism simply not 
exist? This brings up a very general question concerning the I/C dimension and its 
measurement: Do the different instruments assess this construct insufficiently or is 
there no such thing as individualism/collectivism? This discloses a limit inherent to 
the classical test theory approach since here, reliability is dependent on the variance in 
a given population (Formann, 2004), thus the sample used influences the reliability of 
the instrument.  
Another testtheoretical concern is the „bandwidth versus fidelity dilemma“ 
described by Cronbach (1990, p. 208): since individualism and collectivism are very 
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broad constructs, this oftenly results in low reliabilities, as it was the case in the 
current study. Therefore, a choice has to be made between obtaining high reliabilities 
by using questions that focus on only some aspects of the construct and – on the other 
side – increasing the number of situations that the construct has implications for (i.e. 
the bandwidth). 
In addition to that, given that the (Chinese) sample size was heavily reduced 
when including only those participants for whom the manipulation check had been 
successful and the poor measurement quality of the VC-scale, all those subgroups in 
this sample where VC was low (i.e. low VC combined with VI high or low), were 
extremely small. This was also the case for the subgroups containing low HC as a 
variable. Again, this may be due to the fact that both these scales contain items that 
are very likely to be biased by social desirability. As pointed out by Triandis et al. 
(1998), measuring cultural tendencies with attitude items is generally problematic due 
to pressure for social desirability. 
Moreover, in the current study, social desirability is also a problem with 
regard to the measurement of cooperation. Since it was not actual behavior that was 
assessed but behavior intentions, a construct like this – which is extremely socially 
desirable – thus is very likely to be biased when investigated using a self-report 
questionnaire and it remains unclear if cooperation was measured or its social 
desirability. In addition to that it must be noted that there where measuement problem 
concerning the cooperation scale which originally had a reliability of only = .40, 
reflecting how heterogeneous this construct is and how difficult it thus is to 
operationalize. The best reliability that could be attained was = .64 which is still 
relatively low. Therefore, assessing cooperative behavior using experimental methods 
would be largely preferable. However, the problem of cooperation being a very 
heterogeneous construct that has been defined very differently by different authors, 
still remains. 
Another important limitation is the unsuccessful manipulation, especially in 
the reward interdependence condition in the Chinese sample. Due to this, interviews 
were conducted with several Chinese students who had participated in the study, in 
order to find out how they had perceived the questionnaire and what kind of 
difficulties they had met. According to them, one reason for the failure of the 
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manipulation might be the fact that working in groups is very uncommon in 
nowaday’s Chinese universities and schools, and so is giving one mark to the group as 
a whole and that, thus, it is very hard to imagine a situation that appears so „weird“. 
Moreover they reported difficulties with the style of the language which, according to 
them, was rather technical, complex and packed. Since the scenario was unfamiliar 
and the language difficult, many of them worked in groups which may have biased 
the variance in the Chinese sample. Also, many participants had to fill in the 
questionnaire as a homework for a course and therefore did it partly at night after all 
the other work was done. In addition to that, they reported that participants may not 
have been very engaged since it was only hypothetical scenarios. 
The scenario being unusual from the Chinese students’ perspective and the 
fact that the translation of the questionnaire into Chinese was not felicitous, refers to 
methodological problems that are generally met in cross-cultural research: According 
to Triandis (1985), there are four different kinds of equivalence in cross-cultural 
research: conceptual/functional equivalence, equivalence in construct 
operationalization, item equivalence, and scalar equivalence. These four can be seen 
as a hierarchy in that the latter kinds of equivalence imply that the former ones are 
attained. The difficulties with the scenario itself and the following cooperation scale 
as well as with the translation of the questionnaire illustrate problems with 
equivalence in construct operationalization since this requires that the 
operationalization is „equally meaningfully “ (p.133) in both cultures, which 
apparently was not the case here.  
From the fact that a series of studies found that collectivists tended more than 
individualists to leave a group when there is social loafing, Yamagishi (2003, as cited 
by Chen et al., 2005) suggested an institutional view of culture. This is to say that 
collectivists are not instrinsically motivated to stay in groups, but they only do so 
because and when there is a system of formal and informal mutual monitoring and 
sanctioning. This is the case for so called in-groups. However,  such in-groups are 
formed through long-term interaction, which is practically impossible to „create“ in 
experiments (Chen, et al. 2005). This holds true all the more for questionnaires using 
vignettes since the imagining of a certain situation (i.e. working with one’s in-group) 
is even more abstract than an experimentally created in-group situation. The Chinese 
students interviewed after having filled in the questionnaire indicated that they had 
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never taken part in studies such as this one. This lack of experience with studies using 
questionnaires may, for one, explain why the manipulation of the two different 
situations did not work in the Chinese sample. And second, this may be another 
reason why the in-group manipulation via a long-term relationship did not work in the 
questionnaire: the vignette may have been too abstract for creating a feeling of a long-
term relationship including mutual control (i.e. a sufficient in-group feeling), 
therefore not leading to differences between the collectivists and the individualists in 
the extent to which they intended to cooperate depending on the reward structure. 
This interpretation is consistent with the findings of Aritzeta and Balluerka (2006) 
who also found a significant interaction effect of reward interdependence and vertical 
individualism-collectivism only after (real) teams had been working for one year. 
Despite the many limitations of the current study mentioned above, there are 
also some strengthes. This is the first study that not only investigated reward structure 
or individualism-collectivism with regard to cooperation but assessed a possible 
moderating effect that I/C may have. On the contrary to various other studies (e.g. 
Chen, 1995; Suh, 2002), this study assessed differences in I/C on the individual level 
in two countries that could be assumed to differ significantly with regard to this 
dimension. So, instead of explaining observed differences in different countries post 
hoc by using the levels of I/C found in previous culture-level studies (Fischer et al., 
2003), such as the one by Hofstede (1980/2001), a well founded cross-cultural 
comparison has been rendered possible. 
Moreover, the sample size was reasonably large, thus allowing to generalize 
the findings, if not to the population as a whole, but to students in the two respective 
countries. 
 
5.3  Contributions and implications for future research 
Chen et al. (2005) suggest that collectivists do not cooperate more in in-groups 
voluntarily, but because this in-group serves as an informal sanction system since 
members know each other, know what the others do or have done and will meet them 
again, maybe even very oftenly. Similarly, Chen, Wast and Triandis (2007) come to 
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the conclusion that collectivists only cooperate more when there is  a group norm 
prescribing cooperation. Hence, the question is whether – concerning collectivists – it 
is rather about exacting cooperation than about fostering it. Future research should 
therefore make a clearer distinction between forced and deliberate cooperation. 
What still remains unclear after the current study is which aspect is more 
relevant for collectivists’ behavior: the ingroup-outgroup distinction or the high 
sensitivity to situational clues. Therefore, future research should use designs that 
allow for the seperate assessement of these two dimensions in order to determine their 
respective contribution.  
One fundamental problem still lies in the heterogenity of definitions and 
operationalizations of both the cooperation and the I/C construct. Depending on the 
author’s idea of man, cooperation is defined in very different ways and consequently 
it is also operationalized and measured in divers ways: via prisoner’s dilemma/ public 
good games (e.g. Chen et al., 2007; Probst et al. 1999) and other experiments 
including experimenter’s obeservation and self-report as a measurement (Wageman et 
al., 1997), questionnaires and field studies including peer assessement of cooperation 
(Wagner, 1995). Similarily, there is a huge variety of instruments pretending to 
measure individualism/collectivism (e.g. Erez et al., 1987; Oyserman et al. 2002; 
Singelis, 1994; the INDCOL scale by Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis, 1996; Triandis, 
Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Luca, 1988; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Wagner et al., 
1986) and Paquet et al. (2009) found these instruments to be more different than 
similar, making comparisons between the different studies difficult or even 
impossible. Hence, improving the measures of I/C and establishing a more 
homogeneous definition of cooperation that can be operationalized in a standardized 
way (other than by using social dilemmas with a low external validity) are main 
challenges to future research. 
Undergraduate students are far from being represenatative of the whole 
population, yet they are used in (cross-cultural) psychological research almost 
exclusively. The problems met in the current study underline once more that research 
including more heterogenous samples is urgently needed, both with regard to the 
psychometric qualities of measures and the generailzabilty of the findings. 
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Appendix 
 
Individualism-collectivism items (adapted from Triandis, 1996)  
Vertical collectivism ( =.56) 
- I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity. (VC 1)  
- We should keep our aging parents with us at home. (VC 2) 
- It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups. (VC 3) 
- I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of 
it. (VC 4) 
- I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group. (VC 5) 
- Self-sacrifice is a virtue. (VC 6) 
- It annoys me if I have to sacrifice activities that I enjoy to help others (reverse 
scoring). (VC 7) 
 
Horizontal collectivism ( =.72) 
- The well-being of my fellow students is important to me. (HC 1)  
- I like sharing little things with my friends. (HC 2) 
- If a fellow student I am friends with were in financial difficulty, I would help within 
my means. (HC 3) 
- It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a decision. 
(HC 4) 
- If a fellow student I am friends with gets a prize, I would feel proud. (HC 5) 
- It is important to me to maintain harmony within my group. (HC 6) 
- The well-being of my friends is important to me. (HC 7) 
- I like sharing little things with my fellow students. (HC 8) 
- The well-being of my family is important to me. (HC 9) 
 
Vertical individualism ( =.75) 
- It annoys me when other people perform better than I do. (VI 1) 
- Competition is the law of nature. (VI 2) 
- Some people emphasize winning; I'm not one of them (reverse scoring). (VI 3)  
- It is important that I do my job better than others. (VI 4)  
- I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others. (VI 5) 
- Winning is everything. (VI 6) 
- When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused. (VI 7) 
- Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society. (VI 8) 
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Horizontal individualism ( =. 68) 
- I often do "my own thing." (HI 1)  
- I enjoy being unique and different from others. (HI 2) 
- My personal identity, independent from others, is very important to me. (HI 3) 
- I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others. (HI 4) 
- I'd rather depend on myself than on others. (HI 5) 
- Being a unique individual is important to me. (HI 6) 
- I am a unique person, separate from others. (HI 7) 
 
 
Vignette and items measuring cooperation (adapted from Moser et al., 2007) 
Vignette (German original) 
 
In naher Zukunft könnte es in der Studienorganisation einige Veränderungen 
geben. Es gibt Überlegungen, Seminare aufeinander aufzubauen und 
Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für Folgeseminare einzuführen. Es wird zudem 
darüber diskutiert, die Benotung eines Fachgebietes aus verschiedenen 
Einzelleistungen zusammenzusetzen. Im Folgenden wird eine 
Studiensituation beschrieben, wie sie nach diesen Überlegungen vorstellbar 
ist.  
Bitte versetze Dich so gut wie möglich in diese Situation hinein. Lass Dir 
dafür ruhig ein wenig Zeit und gehe erst dann weiter zur nächsten Seite.  
 
Schreiben einer Semesterarbeit 
Du hast im kommenden Semester die Aufgabe, für ein Seminar eine 
Semesterarbeit zu schreiben, deren Grundlage eine Literaturrecherche ist. Du 
sollst dafür mit 2 weiteren Studierenden eine Arbeitsgruppe bilden, in der Ihr 
Euch das Thema gemeinsam erarbeitet. Eine Aufteilung der Recherchearbeit 
ist dabei möglich, aber nicht notwendig. Der Dozent/ die Dozentin erwartet 
von Euch, dass jede/r einen Teil der Semesterarbeit alleine schreibt. Zudem 
soll jede/r ihren/seinen Teil am Ende des Semesters in der Lehrveranstaltung 
präsentieren.  
Nach Abschluss der Semesterarbeit und der Präsentation wird jede/r von 
Euch eine Note für ihren/seinen Teil der Arbeit erhalten.  
 
(Oder: 
Nach Abschluss der Semesterarbeit und der Präsentation wird die Gruppe 
eine gemeinsame Note erhalten, die gleichzeitig für jede/n von Euch die 
individuelle Note darstellt.) 
 
Eine gute bis sehr gute Note (mind. 2)  ist die Zulassungsvoraussetzung zu 
einem Seminar im folgenden Semester, das Dich sehr interessiert und an dem 
Du unbedingt teilnehmen willst. Zudem geht die Note in die Abschlussnote 
des Faches ein. 
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Items measuring cooperation  
(German original; items in bold were the ones retained in the final scale) 
1.) Nun werden 3 verschiedene Weisen vorgeschlagen, wie man bei der 
Literaturrecherche bezüglich der Unterthemen vorgehen könnte. Wie bereits 
gesagt, ist eine Aufteilung der Recherchearbeit möglich, aber nicht notwendig. 
Bitte schätze jeweils die Wahrscheinlichkeit ein, mit der Du die 
Vorgehensweisen wählen würdest. 
a. Jedes Gruppenmitglied sollte für sich suchen. Ein Austausch ist nicht 
nötig. 
b. Erst sollte jedes Gruppenmitglied unabhängig voneinander eine 
Literaturrecherche machen und dann sollten wir überprüfen, ob wir alle das 
Gleiche gefunden haben und ggf. Artikel untereinander austauschen. 
c. Wir sollten die Literaturrecherche gemeinsam machen, und anschliessend die 
gefundenen Artikel für das Lesen und Schreiben von Zusammenfassungen 
untereinander aufteilen. Die Zusammenfassungen werden anschliessend 
untereinander ausgetauscht. 
2.) Ihr habt euch dafür entschieden, dass jede/r für seinen/ihren Teil der Arbeit 
getrennt recherchiert. Ein Gruppemtglied kommt zu dir. Es hat noch nie eine 
Literaturrecherche durchgeführt und bittet dich um Hilfe. Was tust du? 
a. Ich würde das Gruppenmitglied auf andere Anlaufstellen für Hilfe 
aufmerksam machen. 
b. Ich würde ihm meine Unterstützung anbieten und ihm in Ruhe zeigen, 
wie man bei der Literaturrecherche vorgeht. 
3.) Du stösst auf einen Artikel, der für ein anderes Gruppenmitglied interessant 
sein könnte. Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass Du den Artikel weitergibst?  
a. (0= sehr unwahrscheinlich bis 4= sehr wahrscheinlich) 
4.) Ein Gruppenmitglied ist sich nicht sicher, ob es die Regeln für korrektes 
Zitieren gut genug beherrscht und fragt, ob jemand von Euch zweien 
seinen/ihren Teil diesbezüglich Korrektur-Lesen könnte. Wie reagierst Du? 
a. Ich zögere und sage, dass es mir lieber wäre, wenn es das dritte 
Gruppenmitglied machen würde, dass ich es notfalls aber übernehmen würde 
b. Ich schicke ihm/ihr per E-Mail eine Übersicht der wichtigsten Zitierregeln, 
damit er/sie es selber korrigieren kann. 
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c. Ich sage ihm/ihr, dass ich selbst schon genug zu tun habe und es 
eigentlich nicht meine Aufgabe ist, mich um seinen/ ihren Teil auch noch 
zu kümmern 
5.) Eines der anderen zwei Gruppenmitglieder arbeitet an seinem Teil der Arbeit 
Deiner Meinung nach nicht gut genug und sollte sich mehr Mühe geben, um 
sich der Qualität Eurer Beiträge anzupassen. Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass 
Du etwas unternimmst?  
a. (0= sehr unwahrscheinlich bis 4= sehr wahrscheinlich) 
6.) Schliesslich steht auch die Entscheidung über die formale Gestaltung der 
Präsentation an. Bist du eher dafür, ein gemeinsames Layout zu entwickeln 
oder würdest du dir die Zeit lieber sparen, in dem jede/r ihr/sein eigenes 
Layout macht?  
a. (0= „sicher Gruppen-Layout“ bis 4= „sicher mein eigenes Layout“) 
7.) Wie bei den meisten Gruppenarbeiten kommt es auch hier immer wieder zu 
kleinen Meinungsverschiedenheiten. Wie stehst Du diesen gegenüber? 
a. Ich unterstütze immer das Mitglied, das inhaltlich die besseren Argumente 
hat. 
b. Wichtiger als inhaltliche Argumente ist mir, darauf zu achten, dass dabei 
niemand zum Außenseiter wird. 
8.) Die anderen zwei Gruppenmitglieder sind nur mässig engagiert und scheinen 
vor allem am eigenen Vorankommen orientiert zu sein. Im Folgenden sind 3 
mögliche Reaktionen dargestellt. Bitte schätze jeweils die Wahrscheinlichkeit 
ein, mit der Du diese Reaktionen wählen würdest. 
a. Ich engagiere mich so stark wie möglich für die Zusammenarbeit. Ich bin mir 
sicher, dass sich die Anderen dann auch entsprechend engagieren werden. 
b. Ich bringe mich auch nur insoweit ein, wie es mir für meinen Teil der 
Arbeit von Nutzen ist. 
c. Ich halte mich zurück und versuche, vom Engagement der Anderen zu 
profitieren, um besser zu sein als sie. 
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Abstract - English 
The question of how cooperation in work groups can be fostered has generated a 
fairly large amount of literature, investigating different cooperation mechanisms, such 
as superordinate goals or reward interdependence. This latter describes a situation in 
which the reward for a group work is not allocated according to the contribution each 
member made to the achievement of the task (so called equity rule), but to each 
member equally (therefore called equality rule or reward interdependence). Studies 
conducted in Western countries found that reward interdependence lead to more 
cooperative behavior (Moser & Wodzicki, 2007, Wageman et al., 1997), thus is a 
mechanism for fostering cooperation in individualistic cultures. Literature examining 
the influence of culture on cooperative behavior, focusing on individualism-
collectivism arrives at the conclusion that collectivists are not generally more 
cooperative than individualists, but that the extent to which they cooperate depends on 
whether they work with in-group or out-group members (Early, 1989). This study 
examines the question if the effectiveness of reward interdependence as a means of 
fostering cooperation is moderated by culture, i.e. individualism-collectivism. It is 
hypothesized that, first, since individualists do not make a distinction in their behavior 
dependent on whether they work with in- or out-group members, the extent to which 
they cooperate will be influenced by the reward structure, i.e. they will cooperate 
more in situations of reward interdependence than when rewards are distributed 
according to the equity rule. Second, since collectivists make a clear distinction 
between in-group and out-group members, this aspect will guide their behavior more 
than the reward structure, thus, when working with in-group members, the extend to 
which they will cooperate does not depend on the structure of the reward allocated to 
the group. 
The results showed no such moderating effect with the three-way ANOVA (reward 
structure x individualism x collectivism) not being significant. This may be due to 
severe measurement problems both with regard to the cooperation scale and the 
vertical collectivism scale. Moreover, the manipulation was not successful with many 
participants of the Chinese sample in the reward-interdependence condition, which 
reduced one subgroup of the sample dramatically. Depending on whether the whole 
sample was considered or only those where the manipulation had worked, a 
significant two-way interaction was found, indicating that either vertical collectivism 
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or individualism may even be a hindrance when using reward interdependence as a 
means of fostering cooperation. Another possible explanation may be the fact that 
collectivists are more sensitive to situational clues (Chen et al., 2005), thus 
overshadowing the influence of the ingroup-outgroup distinction.  
Future research should therefore further examine two questions: if 
„verticalism“/“horizontalism“ is more important in explaining cross-cultural 
differences in cooperative behavior than I/C and, second, which aspect is more 
relevant for collectivists’ behavior: the ingroup-outgroup distinction or the high 
sensitivity to situational clues. In addition to that, theoretical specification of the 
cooperation and the I/C constructs as well as more reliable measures for both these 
constructs are needed. 
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Abstract - Deutsch 
Zur Frage, wie kooperatives Verhalten in Arbeitsgruppen gefördert werden kann, 
besteht eine umfangreiche Literatur, welche unterschiedliche, sogenannte 
Kooperations-Mechanismen untersucht, wie beispielsweise übergeordnete Ziele oder 
gegenseitige Abhängigkeit bezüglich der Belohungsstruktur (reward 
interdependence). Letztere beschreibt Situationen, in denen die Belohnung für eine 
Gruppenarbeit nicht entsprechend des Beitrages, den jedes einzelne Gruppenmitglied 
zur Aufgabenerfüllung geleistet hat, vergeben wird (sogenannte Equity – Regel). 
Vielmehr wird dabei die Belohnung unter allen Gruppenmitgliedern gleich aufgeteilt 
(sogenannte Equality – Regel bzw. reward interdependence). Studien aus westlichen 
Ländern kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass reward interdependence zu mehr 
Kooperation führt (Moser & Wodzicki, 2007, Wageman et al., 1997), d.h., dass sie in 
indiviualistischen Kulturen einen Mechanismus zur Förderung von Kooperation 
darstellt. Forschung, die den Einfluss von Kultur, insbesondere von Individualismus – 
Kollektivismus, auf kooperatives Verhalten untersucht, zeigt, dass Kollektivisten 
nicht grundsätzlich kooperativer sind als Individualisten, sondern dass das Ausmaß 
ihrer Kooperation davon abhängt, ob sie mit Mitgliedern einer ingroup oder einer 
outgroup zusammenarbeiten (Early, 1989). Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die 
Frage, ob die Effektivität von reward interdependence als Kooperations-Mechanismus 
durch kulturelle Faktoren, d.h. Individualismus – Kollektivismus, moderiert wird. 
Zum einen wird angenommen, dass das Ausmaß kooperativen Verhaltens bei 
Individualisten von der Belohnungsstruktur beeinflusst wird, da sie nicht zwischen 
ingroups und outgroups unterscheiden: sie kooperieren vermutlich mehr bei der 
Equity- als bei der Equality – Regel. Bei Kollektivisten hingegen, sollte das Ausmaß 
kooperativen Verhaltens eher von der Frage bestimmt sein, ob sie mit ingroup- oder 
outgroup-Mitgliedern arbeiten und nicht von der Belohnungsstruktur. Das heißt, wenn 
sie mit ingroup-Mitgliedern arbeiten, wird das Ausmaß, zu dem sie kooperieren, nicht 
von der Belohungsstruktur beeinflußt. 
Die Ergebnisse der dreifaktoriellen Varianzanalyse (Belohungsstruktur x 
Individualismus x Kollektivismus) waren nicht signifikant und konnten somit keinen 
solchen moderierenden Effekt zeigen. Dies könnte an schwerwiegenden 
Messproblemen gelegenhaben, sowohl was die Kooperations – als auch was die 
Individualismus – Kollektivismus-Skala betrifft. Zudem war die Manipulation in der 
 70 
reward interdependence – Bedingung in der chinesischen Stichprobe nicht 
erfolgreich, sodass der Ausschluss der entsprechenden Teilnehmer den Umfang dieser 
Teilstichprobe stark reduzierte. Je nach dem, ob die gesamte Stichprobe betrachtet 
wurde oder nur jene teilnehmer, welche die Manipulation verstanden hatten, zeigten 
sich signifikante Interaktionseffekte in der zweifaktoriellen Varianzanalyse, die 
darauf hin deuten, dass bei vertikalem Individualismus (bzw. Kollektivismus) reward 
interdependence sogar ein Hinderniss darstellen kann bezüglich der 
Kooperationsbereitschaft. Eine ganz andere mögliche Erklärung für dieses Ergebnis 
könnte der Umstand sein, dass Kollektisten stärker auf situationale Hinweisreize (z.B. 
Belohungsstruktur) reagieren (Chen et al., 2005) und dies den Einfluss der ingroup als 
entscheidendem Faktor überschattet. 
Zukünftige Forschung sollte demnach insbesondere zwei Fragen genauer 
untersuchen: Erstens, ob die Unterscheidung zwischen vertikalen und horizontalen 
Orientierungen entscheidender als jene zwischen individualisten und 
kollektivistischen, wenn es darum geht, kulturelle Unterschiede in der 
Kooperationsbereitschaft zu erklären. Und zweitens, welcher Aspekt für das 
Verhalten von Kollektivisten wichtiger: die Unterscheidung zwischen ingroup- und 
outgroup-Mitgliedern oder die besondere Sensibilität für situationale Hinweisreize. 
Zudem ist die weitere theoretische Präzisierung sowohl des Kooperations-, als auch 
des Individualismus – Kollektivismus-Konstrukts von nöten. Schließlich sind auch 
reliablere Messinstrumente für beide Konstrukte dringend erforderlich.
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